Figure 5.4 Income and fertility,suggest, however, is that programstend to flourish where their services-become more attractive. This isparticularly true for women, whoare in demand. Nonetheless, gov- are primarily responsible forfeTotlflalS ernment efforts are vital. bringing up children; as theirrot,opportunities for education and7.0 Sub aharan Africaocioeconoic determinnts employment improve and their6.0 Mid East&N Africa of fertility horizons expand, they often want5.0 ASouthi Fertility is an area of human be- a smaller family. Second, withAsia Latin America & CaribbeanEast1Asia \havior where individual tastes, increasing income, parents appar-4.0 - > religion, culture and social norms ently prefer healthier and better-3.0 - <strong>World</strong>wide norm all play a major role. Yet evidence educated, but fewer children.2.0 - S.Ear~ from large groups of people sug- They are more likely to wantgests that differences in fertility more education for their children1.o - can be largely explained by differ- when they believe that future job00 X 1 1 1 1e500 1s0o 3,500 2,000 2,500 3,0001 ences in their social and economicenvironment. What are the mechopportunitieswill be governedless by class origin or familyGNP pe, person (cu,rewl doUoar5)ao "technical notes for Table 180 f the <strong>World</strong> anisms by which low education, background than by education andDevel,pmrnotIndcaor,tfeetilityrotetocGNprrperson.q-tielati,gt.t.1 poor living conditions, high deathrates and lack of health andassociated skills. Since this tendsto be a consequence of developfamilyplanning services lead to ment, it can help to explain fallinglarge families? fertility over time. Third, thefertility changes among develop- Consider the issue from the children of the poor work at homeing countries from 1960 to 1977. point of view of parents and poten- and outside the home at an earlyThe strength of family planning tial parents. They receive pleasure age: for richer parents, children'sprograms explained an additional from their children but have to work is not so vital to family15 percent. spend time and money bringing welfare.The strength of family planning them up. Children are also a form If children help to support theirprograms is influenced substan- of investment-short-term if they parents in old age, the (low) currenttially by socioeconomic factors work during childhood, and long- costs of raising children are a(which account for about three- term if they support parents in small price to pay. Where mothersquarters of its variation). This helps disability or old age. Since chil- command only low wages, theexplain why family planning pro- dren are a source of satisfaction, differences between children's andgrams in countries with high fer- one might expect richer parents mothers' earnings may be small;tility, such as Pakistan, often to want more of them. Yet the op- work lost by the mother duringappear weak even after years in posite is true, for several reasons. a child's infancy may be easilyoperation. This weakness is often The first is that the alternative recouped by the child later on.written off as simply lack of gov- uses of time-earning money, de- Finally, in poor countries muchernment effort. What the results veloping and using skills, leisure of women's traditional work-inagriculture, crafts and petty retailing-canbe combined with lookingafter children.Figure 5.5 Influences on fertilityThe link between householdpoverty and high fertility is furthermily planningreinforced by high rates of infantprograms~~~~~~~and child mortality; in poor familiesmany births and the high probamaIlerdesiredSmaller desired Lower fertilitybility of infant deaths go hand inhand. In the first place a motherReduction in poverty: A who stops breastfeeding because* Higher female literacy l her baby dies is biologically more* Longer lifctancy Higher age atOther cultural and social factors marriageI likely to conceive another. Parents66t , replace them; and where highmortality is common, social norms
(which respond only gradually to cultural or religious differences. program to reduce populationchanges in mortality) tend to en- But culture never seems to have growth.courage "insurance" against the been an impenetrable barrier to In Latin America, later marriageexpected loss of children. On the fertility change. Once a high enough has been a less important ingredientother hand, high fertility contrib- level of development has been of declining fertility.This has beenutes to high infant and child mor- reached, fertility has fallen without partly because average age at martality:rmany births, especially if exception. Where there was a strong riage was already high comparedthey are close together, can weaken religious or cultural resistance to with Asia, partly because muchboth mother and children. contraception, as in Ireland, fertility of the fertility decline in suchfell through delays in the age at countries as Chile, Colombia andFAMILY PLANNING. The link be- marriage and an increase in life- Costa Rica has been among oldertween household poverty and high long celibacy, rather than through women, and partly because childratesof childbearing is further family planning. bearing outside wedlock is morecemented by the fact that the poorcommon. Fertility is generallystill have very limited access to AGE AT MARRIAGE. Recent de- high and age at marriage lowmodern and simple means of clines in birth rates partly reflect throughout Africa and the Middlecontraception. The contraceptives rising age of marriage among East.available are often expensive, par- women. This has lowered the rateticularly in relation to the incomes of population growth by lengthening Population policy and familyof the poor-and especially if they the interval between generations, planning programsmust be bought from private by shortening the period during Lower fertility is not an end indoctors. For a poor family, limiting which women are likely to have itself, but one among several waysthe number of children may there- babies, and perhaps by giving of improving human welfare. Norfore mean sexual abstinence, women other interests beyond arethebenefitsoffamilyplanningillegal abortion, infanticide-or, family and childbearing to take simply economic. Relatively fewat best, ineffective and difficult with them into married life. couples, even among the poor, wanttraditional contraception. In some Like marital fertility, age at as many children as their naturalcircumstances, the psychological marriage is strongly affected by fertility would allow-witness theor financial costs of avoiding social and economic conditions, hospitalization rates due to selfpregnancymay exceed the costs including women's education and induced abortion in Latin America,of having another child. employment opportunities. The and scattered evidence that someFamily planning programs that average age at marriage (corrected parents do not always do all theyare well designed and implemented for the proportion of women who might to avoid infant deaths,may legitimize what relatives, never marry) is 22 in the middle- particularly of daughters. Poorfriends, the community, the clan income countries of Latin America women are particularly helped byor village might otherwise have and in Malaysia, Singapore and family planning services; so arefrowned upon. These social norms South Korea; but it is less than children, who can benefit from aare often influential. Recent evi- 20 (sometimes much less) in many smaller family.dence indicates that declining Sub-Saharan African countries The case for the public provisionfertility in 19th century Europe and in Nepal, India, Pakistan and of family planning services, andwas not associated with economic Bangladesh. ensuring that the poor have accessfactors in any consistent way. But Later marriage as a mechanism to them, is gradually becoming lessit did follow a similar pattem across of fertility reduction has been most controversial. Some 35 developingregions defined by a common important in Asia. In the 1960s countries, with 78 percent of thelanguage or culture-implying that in South Korea and Peninsular developing world's people, havethe idea of limiting family size Malaysia, changes in the proportion an official policy to reduce populacanaffect fertility independently of women married accounted for tion growth. An additional 14of specific economic change. about half as much of the decline percent of the developing world'sThe same tendency can be seen in the crude birth rate as did changes population lives in countries wheretoday: even taking income and in marital fertility-and were more family planning is supported foreducation differences into account, important than marital fertility reasons of health and welfarethereare national and regional declines in Sri Lanka and the including the health benefits thatdifferences in fertility (Figure 5.4) Philippines. China has placed great come from fewer children.that appear largely the product of stress on delaying marriage in its Some countries have had striking67
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t' 8 ~~~~ottoWorld Development Repo
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Oc 1980 by the International Bankfo
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ivThis report was prepared by a tea
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Text tables2.1 Summary of prospects
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DefinitionsCountry groups in the an
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illion people have barely enough fa
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in official aid and other capital a
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production and consumption; in- Tab
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measures can raise efficiency fairl
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adjustment; but the increases pro-
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dustrialized countries' GNP would T
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- Page 37 and 38: cause individual banks or bank- Tab
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- Page 49 and 50: ably could not have been achieved c
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- Page 55 and 56: ment strategies that assume that in
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- Page 93 and 94: 7 Priorities and progress in region
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Average annual growth rate (percent
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Distribution of gross domestic prod
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Distribution of value added (percen
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EnergyEnergyconsumptionAverage annu
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Merchandise tradeAverage annual gro
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Percentage share of merchandise exp
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Percentage share of merchandise imp
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Destination of merchandise exports
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Destination of manufactured exports
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Current accountbalance before Inter
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Public and publicly guaranteed medi
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External public debtoutstanding and
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Amount1981a 1982a 1983a 1984a 1985a
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Average annualHypotheticalgrowth of
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PercentageCrude Crude Percentage Pe
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Percentage ofpopulation ofworking a
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Percentage of urban population Numb
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Life Infant Childexpectancy mortali
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PercentageDaily calorie supplyPopul
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Number Numberenrolled in enrolled i
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Percentage share of household incom
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Average index Tables 4 and 5. Growt
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28 (minerals, crude fertilizers and
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continues to grow after replacement
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posttax income and conceptually tic
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-~~~ S-~~~~~ sEuropean Office:66, a