New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 13experienced considerable setbacks with the AN/BSY-2 Systems programmes. 55 It isevident that submarine construction remains as an extraordinarily complex project.Perhaps lured by their successes with the Oberon Submarine WeaponUpgrade Project (SWUP), which was criticised in its ambitions by the UK, or enticedby the fact that the UK, US and France were also engaged in similar next generationprojects, the RAN proceeded with Rockwell's proposals. 56 Aware of the limitations ofthe system bid, Kockums and the ASC also, were dissatisfied that theCommonwealth had chosen the American company. 57 As initially it did not receivethe detailed specifications for the combat system, the ASC was disinclined to assumethe responsibility of Prime Contractor (nor was it required to). This, together with thefixed price nature of the contract, meant that the future relations between the RAN,Kockums, the ASC and the government would require careful management.Commercial arrangements did not appear to be auguring well for the project.Complicating the design arrangements too, was that any problem inherent inthe combat system would affect the broader operation of the submarines. As theCollins submarines intended to incorporate a completely integrated operationalsystem, the combat system was then crucial to the overall functionality of the vessel.Without a fully operational combat system, the integrity of the other ship functionssuch as navigation, radar and particularly the sonar could be compromised. For allthose involved in the project, by now the set components allocated, the task was tomake it work.Even if the eventual performance of the combat system was not perfect(compared with the project’s initial requirements, not against other submarines inservice), it did not deny the opportunity for the first two Collins submarines toexercise with the USN’s nuclear submarines. 58 Australia had eventually been moresuccessful than either the UK or US in realising its combat system plans.Furthermore, not only did HMAS Waller (as discussed later) perform well in navalexercises with the US utilising the combat system as implemented by the ASC andthe original Kockums designed platform, (that is, without any US input) the US Navywere to realise what a successful boat had been constructed in Australia. 59iv. A Genuine Shipwreck or Pathological Politicisation?For quite some time the substantial risks involved in the submarine project had beenacknowledged. In 1987, the project management plan identified and addressed therisks prior to the award of the contract. Ongoing project management continued thisprocess. 60 In a response to the Auditor-General's report in 1992-3, Defence hadoutlined an extensive array of risk determinants. These included the,experienced twenty-five per cent cost increases and are around three years later than scheduled fordelivery.55 Paul Dibb, former Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU, and Terry Roach,former submarine commanding officer, not only identify some of the problems with the Seawolf andUpholder programmes, but in very favourably reviewing the submarines also conclude that ‘none of theproblems that have arisen with regard to the Collins is insurmountable’, in ‘Collins: The Submarine WeHad To Have’, Australian Financial Review, 17 February 1999, p. 17.56 Information from interviewee.57 Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, 'Report to the Minister for Defence on Collins Class Submarineand Related Matters', Commonwealth of Australia, June 1999, p. 15, Accessed May 2001.58 Two of the interviewees have commented that the submariners became adept at disregarding theTDHS picture and utilised the sonar picture in similar fashion to their experience on the Oberons. Onestated that the Waller’s successes in 2000 were achieved ‘in spite of’ the combat system then fitted.59 It should be remembered here that the exercises are constructed to engage the submarines so anyresult must be considered with the artificial nature of the situation in mind.60 For an expert review of the project and its successes see, Commander Andy Millar, CSC RAN(Retired), ‘Naval Ships: Collins Class Submarines’, Australian Ships and Ports, December 1999.