New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 19vi. Subscribing to US AssistanceAlthough the ASC and its subcontractors continued to address the problems, as aprompt and public response to the McIntosh-Prescott report in July 1999, JohnMoore approved additional funds of $80 million for a combined RAN/USNprogramme that would seek to rectify some of the operational problems. Moorewould deftly address the ‘crisis’. By December, with the Prescott-McIntosh Report inhand, Moore had approved $266 million for HMAS Dechaineux and Sheean to giveAustralia two operational submarines when the Oberon class, HMAS Otama, wasretired in 2001. Approximately half of the funds were intended to incorporate newtechnology and the remainder to address the other performance difficulties includingimprovements to the sonars, TDHS, weapons control, noise signature, visual andcommunications technology, together with upgraded training and personnelinitiatives. 88 The submarine was tested hydro-acoustically in Alaska. Propellerswere sent to the US for analysis. Some of the flow noise problems were partiallyresolved through the addition of new fibreglass fairings fitted to the fin and other partsof the submarine. The funds also allowed for the trial of some USN submarinecombat system components. 89 In upgrading the communications system, theSubmarine Satellite IX (Information eXchange) System, utilising the USNFLTSATCOM system to provide broadcast and ship to shore communications, wasemployed. 90US aid was also pursued by the Navy in effecting an interim solution for theRockwell’s combat system. 91 Under Project SEA 1446, the USN delivered two setsof augmentation equipment to assist with the combat system problems. Togetherwith the DSTO and the RAN's Submarine Warfare Systems Centre, the US NavalUndersea Warfare Center implemented a system based on USN algorithms andhosted on stand alone hardware. Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, new Head of theSubmarine Capability Team, (formed as result of recommendations of theMcIntosh/Prescott Report), conceded however, that this was only an interim solutionbased on 'flawed foundations'. 92 Flawed foundations proved a correct analysis asthe system, based upon the USN's capabilities with nuclear submarines, generatedtoo much heat for the conventional submarines. Eventually this system would needto be replaced. And although HMAS Dechaineux and HMAS Sheean were thus 'fasttracked' with the new federated system which sought to achieve a minimal level ofoperational capability by the end of 2000, the combat system augmentation was stillnot optimal.Peter Briggs, nevertheless, paid tribute to the US Navy for their completesupport in assisting Australia's ability to have two minimally operational submarinesat a time when the last of the Oberons were phased out. 93 Furthermore, PeterBriggs pointed out that as a result of the 'tank testing and work and support' of theUSN, the Collins had been reshaped with new hull, fin and casing modifications,88 John Moore, Minister for Defence, Media Release, 'Submarine Upgrade Proceeds', MIN 357/99, 9December 1999.89 John Moore, Minister for Defence, Media Statement, 'Reform of Defence Acquisition', 1 July 1999,MIN 188/99, < http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/1999/18899.html >. Accessed May 2001.90 David Foxwell and Mark Hewish, 'Sealing the sea link: a leap in naval communications', InternationalDefense Review, vol.31, no.5, p.32, 1 May 1998.91 McIntosh and Prescott reported that the combat system was inadequate and now obsolete, with aconsequence that the sonars were only about 25 per cent effective. Thomson Marconi Sonar,producers of the sonars claimed that when the combat system was fully operational then the sonarswould also perform as intended.92 Richard Scott, 'Final countdown for new Collins combat system', Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 34, no.2, 12 July 2000.93 Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, Submarine Capability Team Briefing, Transcript of Press Conference,Canberra, 23 July 1999, p. 6.