New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 43and construction experience enriched by their partnership with the ASC: 233 a liaisonthat did not escape the Chinese either. 234And in what may yet be revealed as an ironic twist for proponents ofalliances in all respects, Northrop Grumman, the last constructor of conventionalsubmarines for the US Navy, reputedly had held talks with HDW to providesubmarines and frigates to ‘the US and its allies.’ Moreover, Kent Kresa, Chairmanof Northrop Grumman, has countenanced the possibility of the company assuming astake in HDW Group. There has also been speculation that this company wasbehind One Equity Partners’, (the private equity company of Chicago’s Bank OneCorporation), acquisition of 75 per cent of shares in HDW in 2002. 235 Relevant tothe argument presented in the chapter is that analysts commenting on thistransaction recorded Bank One’s acquisition of the HDW Group’s highly desirabletechnology. 236 It is thus worth reiterating that during the course of the Collins projectAustralia too had acquired much sought after technology.There are other matters though that now merit contemplation. What mightthis say of US pressure for Australia to rebuff HDW’s interest in the ASC? What ofthe technical arguments that interoperability issues were insurmountable if Australiapersisted with its European partners? Alternately, whilst intellectual property issuesrequire resolution, if HDW was owned by a US company could it be considered as apossible equity purchaser of the ASC? Does this also now provide the US with aconventional submarine combat system? No doubt there are complex commercialand state based IP issues inherent in these transactions but arguably, solutions suchas escrow arrangements have provided some opportunities for resolving relatedissues in the past. 237xvi. Conclusion: Increased IntimacyA significant feature of the alliance for Australia has been the entry it has provided forthe 'preferential access to US technology'. This has been of import in thedevelopment of Australia's high technology defence strategy. 238 This wasmaintained in the Defence 2000 policy document and is necessitated to a point bythe peculiarities of Australia's demography and geographic and oceanographicenvironment. Would the rejection of the US combat system proposal jeopardise this?If it did, it then would indeed indicate more than the moue of fragility in alliancerelations. The more likely result is that it may occasion a pause in submarinecooperation rather than a panoramic seizure of defence cooperation. 239 Even so, ifencountered with this prospect, does Australia not possess the sophisticated skills todiplomatically resolve issues of difference with the US?Could it jeopardise Australian access to RMA technology and systems? 240The choice of a European submarine combat system does not exclude Australia fromforce planning machinery and systems, nor would allied planning interfaces be short233 Neil Baumgardner, ‘Butler: Taiwan Submarine Program Appears Delayed Until 2006’, Defense Daily,vol. 219, issue 8, 11 July 2003.234 Lynne O’Donnell and Sid Marris, ‘Beijing warns on sub sales to Taiwan’, The Australian, 22 April2002, p. 7.235 Neil Baumgardner, ‘Butler: Taiwan Submarine Program Appears Delayed Until 2006’, Defense Daily,vol. 219, issue 8, 11 July 2003.236 ‘Bank One gets HDW’s Coveted Technology’, Fuel Cell Technology News, 1 July 2002.237 The German government would argue that any transfer of the HDW Group’s submarine technology isstill subject to Berlin’s approval. There is also some suggestion that Bank One’s ownership of HDWmay only be temporary.238 Des Ball, 'Strategic Planning for the Defence of Australia in 2015', in Des Ball, (ed.), Maintaining theStrategic Edge: The Defence of Australia in 2015, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 133,SDSC, RSPAS, ANU, Canberra, 1999, pp. 14-16.239 Worth remembering here is that the British furore over rejection of their bid for the submarineplatform soon dissipated.240 Revolution in Military Affairs.