New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 18manoeuvring control data, 2) the surface system, which included the surface radar,ship identification and periscopes, 3) the sonar system and data processing systemused to track multiple targets, and 4) the electronic surveillance measures and 5) thetactical data handling system (TDHS). As the core system of the five, wasresponsible for the data collection from the previous four systems. The TDHSprocessed and displayed the navigational, periscope, sonar, and electronicsurveillance information. It provided data distribution, integrated and processedautomated functions, and enabled operator display and control for all combat systemfunctions. Ultimately it provided the function whereby targets were engaged. 80Consequently, the TDHS was the most intricate and clearly the central problem. Itappeared that the complex technical challenge in developing this system for thesophisticated suite of sonars installed in the Collins was gravely underestimated byRockwells and its subcontractors. In part it explains the difficulties with its delivery. 81As early as 1991 the Project Office had received reports that the installationof the TDHS was subject to slippage and by 1992 a Project Office Report revealedthat testing showed that 'the system was driven by schedule rather than anyoverriding commitment to achieve the requirement of quality standards.' 82 Althoughthe original submarine schedule allowed for only two releases of the combat systemsoftware, in 1991 and with the Collins in 1993, neither were delivered. 83If the TDHS was chronically problematic, the Integrated Ship ControlManagement and Monitoring System, (ISCMMS) was an innovative andreverberating success. This ship management system was responsive to the RANneeds for a minimum crew component. As such it offered automated control andmonitoring of the platform functions, including manoeuvring. Whilst it was initiallyperceived as a higher risk enterprise 84 it was successfully implemented.Through the acquisition of Rockwell's defense and aerospace businesses in1996, Boeing assumed the defence arm of Rockwell International. Boeing Australiathen, as the new combat system prime contractor, assumed responsibility for theinstallation and integration of the combat system, the communications suites andoverall programme and systems management. The significant difficulty Boeingexperienced was that the original Rockwell system was restricted by an architecturethat would stall the integration of advances in technology throughout its eight yearhistory. It was thus unable to employ the dramatic advances in architectures allowingincreased processing function, networking and memory availability. And althoughworkable, it thus denied the possible contributions from companies such as ThomsonSintra Pacific (later to become Thomson Marconi Sonar) whose knowledge and skillsin sonar arrays and electronics was invaluable. 85Eventually, in February 2000, the Department of Defence decided to releasea Request for Proposal to four combat system suppliers and ASC for a new combatsystem. 86 Governmental approval was eventually provided and as stated in theDefence 2000 White Paper, all submarines would be fitted with a new combatsystem, with work beginning in 2001 and completion planned in 2005-2006. 8780 Australian National Audit Report, Performance Audit, New Submarine Project, Department ofDefence, The Auditor-General Audit Report No.34, 1997-8, p. 97.81 I am indebted to several of the interviewees for an explanation of the TDHS.82 Australian National Audit Report, Performance Audit, New Submarine Project, Department ofDefence, The Auditor-General Audit Report No.34, 1997-8, p. 99.83 Australian National Audit Report, Performance Audit, New Submarine Project, Department ofDefence, The Auditor-General Audit Report No.34, 1997-8, p. 103.84 Andy Millar, ‘Collins Class Successes’, provided by Andy Millar to the author in October 2003. It isalso worth noting that it remains difficult, internationally, to recruit and maintain submariner numbers.85 Hans J. Ohff, personal communication, 22 May 2001.86 Royal Australian Navy, 'The Collins Class Submarine', p. 4, < http://www.NAVY.GOV/Collins.htm >.Accessed May 2001.87 Department of Defence, 'Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Forces', Canberra, 2000, p. 90.