New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 27The most publicised of these has been the SUBACS/BSY-1 weapons control systemfor the USN Los Angeles class nuclear attack submarines and the BSY-2 system forthe Seawolf class. Both were made by Lockheed Martin, who also designed andintegrated the Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence system, (C3I), forthe new Virginia class attack submarines. When questioned in 1999 about thefeasibility of replacing the combat system with BSY-1 or BSY-2, Peter Briggsresponded that a nuclear submarine combat system 'would probably not be theanswer for us', but if BSY-3, the proposed architecture for the next generation USnuclear submarine was being developed as commercial technology also for use inconventional submarines then it may be considered. 140 It was expected that thiswould be the basis for their Collins proposal.However, McIntosh and Prescott had recommended that it was indeed timefor Australia to choose a new system engaging COTS equipment. 141 Shortlistedcandidate, STN-Atlas, proposed exactly that. Developed for the conventionalsubmarine market, the STN-Atlas ISUS-90 system was an adapted off the shelfmodular combat system networked using open architecture. Ten of the world'sconventional submarine fleets had successfully implemented the ISUS system, theseincluded Germany, Italy, South Korea, Turkey, South Africa and Greece.Furthermore, ISUS-90 had also been interfaced with US, UK, German and Italianweapons. Importantly in this argument, most intimate of US allies, Israel, operatedthe Dolphin class submarine, as designed by HDW and utilised the ISUS 90 whichcontrolled the deployment of the US Harpoon missile. COTS technology was alsonot without its detractors, however. Procurement of spare parts was sometimesproblematic.Nonetheless, in constructing the argument for the STN-Atlas ISUS-90system, naval consultant, Graeme Dunk, first dispensed with the claims made for theRaytheon system. He suggested that the assertions were often made that ifAustralia did not purchase its hardware from US sources then it risked the withdrawalof access to US technology. For Dunk, this reeked of an uncontested fragility inAlliance relations. Instead he perceived it more likely that:the US is prepared to promote its industrial and commercial activities under theguise of alliance relationships; and that the Australian submarine community seesitself as an extension of the US submarine community, and thereby uses technologyaccess as a convenient argument. 142Moreover, he regarded the procurement of the CCS as an orphan system operatingonly under the umbrella of a nuclear submarine philosophy. So, controversially, itremained that the Australian government through its purchasing agencies hadsecured its options for both an independent and proven, if European, operator, andits ubiquitous and powerful ally. 143140 Transcript of Press Conference, Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, Head Submarine Capability Team,Russell, Canberra, 23 July 1999, p. 15.141 Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, 'Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins ClassSubmarine and Related Matters', Commonwealth of Australia, June 1999, p. 21, . Accessed May 2001.142 Graeme Dunk, 'The Collins combat system', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, December/January2001, pp. 14-15.143 Gary Brown and Laura Rayner claim that this decision was ‘a clear case of the allianceinappropriately overshadowing operational priorities. It seems clear that the Navy’s submarineprofessionals wished to acquire the German combat system offering but have been overruled in favourof an unproven solution to be developed by a state, the US which has had no experience ofconventionally powered submarine operations for at least forty years.’ Gary Brown and Laura Rayner,‘Upside, Downside: ANZUS: After 50 Years’, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Current IssuesBrief 3, 2001-02, < http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-02/02cib03.htm >. Accessed October