New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 20leading and trailing edges and new casing fairings, all significant in improving theacoustic signature’. 94 Peter Briggs’ statements, however, remain contested. WithRAN and DSTO personnel present, a scale model of the submarine had been testedin the USN’s hydrodynamic testing tanks and DSTO Melbourne’s wind tunnel hadbeen utilised to test the flow over the hull. The USN modified three of the existingpropellers for trial, one of which has been discarded. They also offered another ofthe USN propellers for use. At that time, however, whilst the RAN had been providedwith evaluations, there remained no independent testing available to the constructor,ASC, that had assessed the effectiveness of the US modifications to propellers, thehydro acoustic testing and combat system augmentation. 95vii. The Sub Plot: US Strategic Stakes in the Littoral BattlespaceIt should not be mistaken that the US had only assumed an interest in the Collins in2000. It appears instead for force capability reasons that the USN was vitallyinterested in the submarine technology developed in Australia. Although mostcertainly it would exert a powerful presence in the selection of the new combatsystem and sale of the ASC, the US military had kept abreast of the Collins projectfrom inception. As the USN was cognisant of the value of the conventionalsubmarine yet unable to persuade the government to construct these boats in the USas it might jeopardise the nuclear industry, the next best option was to foster alliedengagement in their construction and operation. 96 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JohnShalikashvili, who was in Australia to attend the Australia-US Ministerial talks, alsoattended the commissioning ceremony for HMAS Collins in 1996. 97 Through the1990s, the US military had also altered its maritime mindset from the Carrier BattleGroup anti-sub warfare (ASW) and anti-SSBN operations focus of the Cold War tothe littoral battlespace of the 21st century navy. No longer did a single definedenemy preoccupy the US military, instead operational intent was reoriented to amuch less homogenous cache of littoral based enemies, those of disaffected nationstatesor terrorist and criminal groups, as aided by both increasingly technologicallysophisticated weaponry 98 and an atavistic arms market. (While China existed in theforefront of the Bush administration’s threat perception field and had assumed a newstatus as 'strategic competitor', in 2001, it did not have the power projection, nor posethe same threat, as the former USSR.)So, by the mid-1990s, the USN had reoriented itself to a very differentstrategic view. Navy policy documents stated that:(t)he primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project American powerfrom the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across theoperational spectrum of peace, crisis and war…Our attention and efforts willcontinue to be focused on operating in and from the littorals…Seventy-five per centof the Earth's population and a similar proportion of national capitals and majorcommercial centers lie in the littorals. These are the places where Americaninfluence and power have the greatest impact and are needed most often. 9994 Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, Submarine Capability Team Briefing, Transcript of Press Conference,Canberra, 23 July 1999, pp. 10-11.95 Hans J. Ohff, personal communication, 22 May 2001.96 Andrew Millar has offered this as an opinion on the U S submarine industry and allied engagement.Personal Communication, 17 November 2003.97 Colin Blair, 'Collins' platform is fine but combat system still needs tuning', Asia-Pacific DefenceReporter, September/October, 1996, p. 27.98 United States Navy, 'Forward…From Under the Sea', Autumn 1998, p. 1, . Accessed May 2001.99 United States Navy, 'Forward…From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept', March 1997, pp. 1-2, . Accessed May 2001. One of theinterviewees has also observed that joint exercises such as RIMPAC have often served to remind theUSN of the risks presented by conventional submarines.