New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 40project, and the army’s replacement of its Leopard tanks. 217 As funds weredemanded from the budget beyond the initial commitment then pressure alsoincreased. Condemnation of the project thus emanated not just from interestsoutside the RAN but also from within. These criticisms were also utilised by others infurthering their political agendas.Unfortunately for both the submariners and ASC personnel, they needed tocontinually battle this manifestation of governmental risk management. RAN RearAdmiral K. J. Scarce, Head of Maritime Systems, took to the papers in this skirmishand publicly defended the submarines,(t)oday, Australia’s submarines are regarded as arguably the most capableconventional submarines in the world – in my book, it is submarine performance that is thetrue measure. 218So, when Tore Svensson of Kockums Pacific Technology wondered, ‘(j)ustwhy a submarine hailed by leading naval officers throughout the world is subject to aconcerted campaign of derision at home is hard to understand’, 219 there was muchmore than just the government’s IP dispute with Kockums beneath the surface.xv. US Concentration on a Suitable ResultAs some ironic testimony to the eventual success of the Collins project, the USbegan to exercise its presence in the decision-making processes for both theownership of the ASC and the choice of combat systems and torpedoes. 220 In orderto glue US involvement, senior officials plunged into the fray. New US Ambassadorto Australia, Edward Gnehm, called on Australia to install a combat systemcompatible with US hardware. 221 And as the tender and sale process intensified, ahigh level US Defence official, (on instructions from William Cohen), and four seniornaval officials informed John Moore in November of 2000, not only of the preferencesthe US held on both issues but also of the consequences for Australia if it did notbend to these desires. First, the US had expressed objections to the possiblepresence of European equity partners in the ASC. It foreshadowed insurmountabledifficulties in technical cooperation should the Europeans become involved in thecompany. Safeguards were thought to be unavailable to protect US technology andintelligence utilised on the submarines, from its European competitors. Second, USAdmiral 'Skip' Bowman, Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, would notcountenance non-US built torpedoes being fired at US submarines in exercises onsafety grounds. Third, the US believed the new combat system should be fullycompatible with US systems in order to maximise the military partnership. So then,to the threats. Failure to acquiesce, for Australia, would preclude any strategicsubmarine partnership. 222At this point too, it is worth acknowledging one dynamic and reiteratinganother. First, whilst the US defence industry was undoubtedly competitive in217 Some of those interviewed commented on the range of other armed services projects that werejeopardised by the Collins’ outlay.218 Rear Admiral, K. J. Scarce, ‘Measure the Collins -class by performance’, Letters to the Editor, TheAdvertiser, 16 July 2003, p. 18.219 Tore Svensson, ‘Ask why they are trying to sink our super subs’, The Advertiser, 16 July 2003, p. 20.220 A.D. Baker III, ‘World Navies in Review’ International Navies Focus, US Naval Institute Proceedings,vol. 127/3/1, Annapolis, Maryland, 2001, p. 33. Baker refers to the ‘heavy-handed pressure from the USDepartment of Defense in the prospective sale of the Australian Submarine Corporation at Adelaide, theselection of the new torpedos for the Collins class, and the choice of the new command system’.221 Roger Martin and Robert Garran, 'US early warning on defence', The Australian, 11 October 2000, p.2.222 Robert Garran, 'US threat to sink strategic alliance', The Weekend Australian, 23-25 December 2000,p. 1.