New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 5NEW DEPTHS IN AUSTRALIA-US RELATIONS: THE COLLINS CLASSSUBMARINE PROJECTSuch was the luck of the Collins class submarine project that when Building K wasdemolished at Russell Hill in August 2000, it was reported that the classifieddocuments which surfaced unexpectedly in the deconstruction were, of course, thosebelonging to the submarine project. 1While this was indicative of the troubled public history of these submarines, Iconsider this submarine project as it provides an insight into the Howardgovernment’s management of both its US relations and the domestic politicalenvironment, rather than simply a commentary upon the project per se. Between1996 and 2003, the Howard government turned to a re-emphasis of the relationshipwith one of Australia’s traditional allies as the cornerstone of security policy. Sosignificant was this orientation, that in 2003 two alliance analysts claimed ‘(t)hetheme of defense self reliance has been superseded’, by an emerging ‘strategicinterdependence’ with the US. 2 Not only did Australia enlist in US military operationsin Afghanistan and Iraq but Australian defence procurement was increasingly skewedto US suppliers. On the signing of the submarine cooperation statement in 2001, thethen Defence Minister, Peter Reith, stated that this was ‘further evidence of thisGovernment’s commitment to the historic alliance between Australia and its close allyand friend the United States.’ 3 The Collins project thus was captured within atransition process whereby the government sought to establish greater intimacy withthe US.In the domestic arena the Howard government also utilised an upgradedrelationship with the US to assuage fears of uncertainty and insecurity. Domesticallytoo, any accentuation of the project’s faults, could be employed to disparage theLabor opposition (who initially sponsored the project) and utilised to arrest its thenincreasing electoral threat. So, in spite of Navy and defence industry recognition thatAustralia had constructed an exceptional platform, the government could use thepublicity surrounding the faults in the boats, not only to effect US involvement in theproject, but to damage the electoral opposition. It was also clear that the governmentused the project to demonstrate that, in the end, only the Coalition was capable ofdelivering an adequate weapons and intelligence gathering platform in themaintenance of security.I begin this paper with a brief history of the project, then examine thepoliticisation and the nature of the reporting surrounding the delivery andperformance of the submarines. I also consider the necessity of the Howardgovernment’s call for US assistance in ‘resuscitating’ the venture. Here I deliberateon the effect of US interest in the Collins, before addressing some of theconsequences of US involvement in the project, namely its affect on the sale of theASC and the procurement of US technology and weaponry. My aim is to review thedeleterious effect of the politicisation of the project as it has impacted upon thedelivery of a successful naval venture. Concurrently I analyse the submarine1 Lincoln Wright, ‘Secrets Blow About Building Site’, Canberra Times, 23 August 2000, p. 3. N.B. I havenot confirmed the veracity of this report.2 Rod Lyon and William T. Tow, ‘The Future of the Australian-US Security Relationship’, StrategicStudies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, December 2003, p. 34, . Accessed January 2004. It needs to be noted that Australia’saspirations for greater defence independence were formally expressed in 1972 whilst it was later in the1980s the concept of ‘self reliance’ was articulated as embedded within the alliance relationship.3 The Hon. Peter Reith MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Australia and US sign submarine cooperationstatement’, Media Release, 12 September 2001.