New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

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Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 28As regards US political support for US defence industries, Japan wouldrecall only too well US Defense department's pressure for Japan to acquire more USmade hardware. Exemplifying this were the inter-agency discussions in 1991. Afterbilateral defence consultations, Yukihiko Ikeda, Defence Agency Director, wasrequested by US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, to increase direct purchases ofUS military hardware. This followed on from a dispute regarding the Japanese plansto construct a fighter plane in the late 1980s, which was resolved by a joint venturewith US companies. 144When questioned in an Australian Senate Hearing regarding possible USpressure on purchasing choices, Michael Roche, Under Secretary for DefenceAcquisition, 145 answered cautiously. In responding to a specific question suggestingthat unless Australia bought US sourced equipment then technological assistancemay not be as forthcoming in other areas, Roche stated diplomatically that he soughtto,avoid saying that there are other pressures…I am saying instead, in positive termsthat there is an objective process going on here that is assessing the technologyavailable in various countries against the need of the Collins class. 146However, the shortlisting of the Collins Replacement / Upgraded CombatSystem (CRUCS) contenders was, nevertheless, contentious. While STN AtlasElecktronik was regarded by the evaluation team as the prime candidate, RaytheonSystems Company was also shortlisted, despite its third ranking behind UnderwaterDefence Systems International, led by the French, Thomson-CSF (now Thales). Inthe technical evaluations Lockheed Martin Naval Systems also finished ahead ofRaytheon. STN-Atlas was favoured by DAO (Defence Acquisition Organisation) andindeed many submariners, as not only was it proven in diesel electric submarines butit was regarded as a more capable system. Furthermore, A.W. Grazebrook, longtimeobserver of the project, argued that DAO and many RAN submariners believedthat the STN bid was attractive in its offering of proven submarine technology in thatit combined European diesel submarine combat system technology (from STN Atlas),European nuclear submarine technology (BAE Systems) access to USN nuclearsubmarine technology (from Lockheed Martin) and extensive experience andinnovative development from working with RAN submariners for many years (from2002. Derek Woolner concurs with this assessment writing that ‘(t)he lessons of recent history are thatneither sponsorship by the US Armed Forces nor development by corporate America can guaranteesuccess in systems integration programs…The problem is, that …the Minister’s decision has placed thefuture of the Collins class in the hands of a supplier who does not have as yet an operational system, letalone one proven by Service use in conventional submarines. Should problems develop, there is nobody of operational experience on which to call.’ See Derek Woolner, ‘Getting in Early: Lessons of theCollins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement’, Department of theParliamentary Library, Research Paper, No. 3, 2001-02.144 Further examples of specific industry requests may be found in, Gwen Robinson, 'Pressure to buyUS', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, July 1991, p. 16, and Desmond Wettern about the need for UScompanies to relinquish complete reliance on the Pentagon for business, in 'US defence industries seeknew markets', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, July, 1991, pp. 33-34.145 Following the recommendations of the McIntosh-Prescott report, John Moore moved to restructurethe defence acquisition group and thereby give added impetus to the ongoing submarine project. Notonly would a new position of Head of Defence Acquisition be established at the level of junior secretarybut recruitment and secondment would look to industry to strengthen its commercial and projectmanagement skills. Both procurement and acquisition officials would be required to report in greaterdetail to Cabinet.146 Question and answer exchange between Senator Chris Schacht and Michael Roche, CPD, SenateHansard, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, 29 May 2000, p. 109.
Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 29STN Sonartech). Moreover they regarded the STN Atlas DM2A4 heavyweighttorpedo as superior to the Mk 48 ADCAP. 147As a response to the perceived concerns over the release of US proprietaryweapon interface data to third party interests, STN had brought Lockheed MartinNaval Electronic and Surveillance Systems-Undersea Systems into its bid team asweapon integration contractor. It thus intended that US weapon interface data wouldbe supplied directly from the USN to the RAN via the American company. Althoughthe RAN utilised the US Sub-Harpoon anti-ship missile and Mk 48 Mod 4heavyweight torpedo, these weapons were also under review in 2000. Shortlisted forthe replacements were the upgraded Raytheon Mk 48 ADCAP, STN's DM2A4torpedo and Whitehead's Alenia Sistemi Subacquei Black Shark. 148 Defence hadscheduled the project to replace Australia's heavyweight torpedo to begin in 2002-3,with entry into service in 2006. 149 Always close to the surface, however, was thequestion of Australia's deployment of cruise missiles, especially as for some, theCollins submarines were the ideal (and ready) launch platform.So clear, however, were the government’s objectives in welding togethertheir relationship with the US, that it terminated the selection processes for both thecombat system and torpedo selection. In July 2001, Minister for Defence, PeterReith, stated instead that the Australian and US Navies would enter ‘into a Statementof Principles arrangement to achieve a shared goal of maximum cooperation andsynergy on submarine matters.’ 150 (This was the document referred to earlier assigned by David Shackleton and Vern Clark.) Unsurprisingly then, a year later, thegovernment announced its intention to purchase the $400 million Raytheon CCSMark II tactical command and control system. This would be sourced through the USNavy. 151 That it would provide access to the US real time operational network waspersuasive for its proponents. 152 . It remains, nonetheless, that the resolution of themature risk in the current combat system proposal remains to be demonstrated. 153And whilst the desirability of interoperability with Australia’s allies in many situationsmay be well argued, it is also manifest that capability is the first port of call.The government continued with its US procurement resolve and alsoacquired the US, Mk 48 Mod 7 ADCAP torpedoes. These would be developedthrough a joint US-Australia programme. 154 In 2003 the US and Australia signed amemorandum of understanding to work jointly with Northrop Grumman on the sonarsystem upgrade for the heavyweight torpedoes. It is also worth noting that the CCSMK 2 system, in the US Los Angeles and Virginia class nuclear submarines, will beresponsible for the control and launch of both the MK 48 torpedoes and theTomahawk missilexi. Tomahawk Missile DeploymentAt this juncture, prior to a consideration of the deployment of Tomahawks in theCollins I intend to briefly revisit the arguments thus far. It is axiomatic that anyproject of the Collins scale and complexity would encounter problems to be resolved147 A.W. Grazebrook, 'US pressure in RAN submarine competition', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter,August/September 2000, p. 38.148 Richard Scott and Ian Bostock, 'Final countdown for new Collins combat system', Jane's DefenceWeekly, vol. 34, no.2, 12 July 2000.149 Department of Defence, 'Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Forces', AGPS, Canberra, p. 91.150 The Hon. Peter Reith, MP, Minister for Defence, ‘Submarines Combat System’, Media Release, MIN244/01, 9 July 2001.151 Senator, The Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, ‘Replacement combat system for the CollinsClass’, Media Release, MIN 479/02, 13 September 2002.152 Information from interviewee.153 I thank some of the interviewees for a reminder of this at this juncture.154 Australian Submarine Corporation, ‘Advanced Capability Torpedoes for Submarines’, 1 April 2003, . Accessed September 2003.
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