New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 7deterrent. By virtue of its very existence it can protect Australia and Australianinterests through threat of retaliation and it requires a totally disproportionateresponse to counter even the possibility of its presence.’ 10 The project consideredthe needs for surveillance and response to potential conflict in warm waters near toAustralian shores. Past experience and operations of the Oberon submarinesprovided the foundations for the new submarines’ design. 11 Given Australia's uniquegeographic and oceanographic situation, this, however, did not alter the necessity forthe submarines to cover distances up to 9000 nautical miles. 12 It also did not alterthe fact that Australian planners were ever conscious of eventual Chinese greatpower capability and the instability on the Korean peninsula. Around that time too,analysts of the Soviet Pacific fleet claimed that,(b)y the early 1980s the long term Soviet military build-up in the Pacific had reachedproportions that now threaten a military balance so long favourable to the US and itsfriends and allies in Asia and the Pacific. 13Soviet high performance submarines, and surface ships repeatedly traversedAustralia’s maritime region. 14 At this time, US Admiral William Crowe, Commanderin Chief (Pacific) sought Australia's assistance in ensuring sea lanes of trade andcommunication in the Pacific remained open in the face of the 'Soviet challenge'. 15 Inthis, ANZUS had a significant role to play. 16 Thus, the original parameters for thedesign, range, endurance, speed and weapon load were also commensurate withpossible action, in concert with its allies, against the USSR.Thus, the submarines needed to function in environments with greatvariations in temperature, density, salinity, humidity and climate. Arguing therefore,for long range and maximisation of weapon load, the Australian Navy sought largeconventional submarines, 17 with highly advanced sensor and weapons suites. The10 Andy Millar, ‘The Collins is a first-rate sub’, Canberra Times, 7 June 1999.11 Geoffrey Barker provides a vignette of the operations of the Oberons in ‘The mystery boats’, TheAustralian Financial Review Magazine, December 2003, pp. 17-21.12 Bill Hayden, MP, details the significance of Australia’s security interests in the North Pacific. HereHayden observes that in the late 1980s, 40 per cent of the Soviet sea-based strategic deterrent waslocated in the Far East and that this force was ‘highly threatening’ to those in the region. See, ‘Securityand arms control in the North Pacific’, in Andrew Mack and Paul Keal, (eds.), Security and Arms Controlin the North Pacific, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1988, pp. 1-7, specifically p. 5. In the same text, PaulDibb details his concerns over Australia’s poor knowledge of the North Korean regime and the need forincreased warning time of potential conflict. Paul Dibb, ‘The global context of North Pacific security’,Andrew Mack and Paul Keal, (eds.), Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, Allen and Unwin,Sydney, 1988, p. 25.13 John C. Dorrance, former State Department specialist in Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Affairs,claimed that the Soviet navy operated 124 submarines in the Pacific area in the end of 1982. See'Coping with the Soviet Pacific Threat', Pacific Defence Reporter, July 1983, pp. 21-29. Dora Alves alsoprovides a summary of the Soviet Pacific maritime strategy in 'The submarine's role in the Soviet PacificStrategy', Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1984, pp. 10-14.14 Information from interview.15 Transcript of question and answer session with Admiral William Crowe, 'Help wanted in protecting vitalsea lines', Pacific Defence Reporter, Annual Reference Edition, December 1984/ January 1985, p. 56.16 It should als o be noted that the ANZUS signatories concluded the Radford-Collins Agreement in 1951.Thomas -Durrell Young observed that this ‘maritime security arrangement, named after its signatories,Admiral William Radford, U.S. Navy, and Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins, Royal Australian Navy, providesfor the implementation of allied naval control and protection of shipping in the Pacific and Indian oceans.The present members of the agreement are assigned "areas of maritime responsibility," where, in timesof tension or conflict, each nation is to provide command and control of shipping as well as directantisubmarine warfare operations. In recognition of its limited defense capability, New Zealand is notexpected to be able to provide for all the vessels and aircraft that would be required for the completesecurity of the New Zealand area. ’ See Thomas -Durell Young, ‘New Zealand Air Power Requirementsand Force Determinants’, Maxwell, Air Uni Review, March-April 1986.17 See A.W. Grazebrook, 'Collins class comes up down under', Jane's Navy International, vol. 103, no.1, 1998, p. 21. At that time, at 3500 tonnes, it was to be the largest conventionally powered submarine.