New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 16anticipate alterations in mission and technology. 72 It should also be considered thatalthough the fixed price contract reduced the generation of cost overruns, it createddifficulties in allowing for the fulfilment of altered naval requirements over anextended period of construction. They also commented on the deleterious effect ofup front payments in complex and new projects. The authors stated that fixed pricecontracts also have the effect of establishing financial and then technical barriers tocooperation between contractor and customer. They surmised that,(p)articularly in the later stages, it can encourage the supplier to contest thespecifications and their interpretation and to avoid responsibility wherever possibleto protect profit. Conversely, it can encourage the buyer to incorporate everythingpossible into the interpretation of the contract. 73This complicated relations between the ASC and RAN in the submarine project.McIntosh and Prescott reported too, on a raft of specific technical problems,(some which resulted from the alterations in expectations). They stated thatdefective aspects of the platform itself included: a fuel system allowing watercontamination of the diesel engines; defective diesel engines themselves; vibrationand focus problems in both periscopes; failure to install satellite communicationssystems; and an ineffective communications mast. Significantly, for a submarineplatform, the Report declared that the Collins was plagued by noise problems.Emanating primarily from the cavitation and flow characteristics of the submarinedesign, the hull shape, fin and propeller design required either alteration orreplacement. As the propellers suffered from fatigue in addition to the noise creationproblems, they saw that particular attention was required. 74As the McIntosh-Prescott report identified many problems that both theDepartment of Defence and the ASC had stated were now either resolved or in theprocess of resolution 75 this raises the question as to why these faults were reportedupon again. In particular, the ASC contested the claims made concerning thesubmarine shape and the noise characteristics. They regarded parts of the Reportas based on incorrect analysis. 76 Arguably, too, although the Report claimed that asa consequence of the operational limitations, crew training and morale becamedifficult to sustain, it was the politicisation of the project and the Defence Minister’sdeleterious public comments that not only were the primary source of crew andindustry worker morale depletion, they irrevocably skewed the public predispositionof a remarkable project.This politicisation of the project also served another function in addition tothe denigration of Beazley Labor. By disregarding the action already in position toaddress any deficiency in the submarines, and by publicising instead the supposedfaults, the government could clear the deck to allocate more funds to the project andinvite assistance from the US. For the Minister of Defence, the MacIntosh-Prescott72 Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, 'Report to the Minister for Defence on The Collins ClassSubmarine and Related Matters, Commonwealth of Australia, June 1999, p. 6, . Accessed May 2001.73 Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, 'Report to the Minister for Defence on The Collins ClassSubmarine and Related Matters, Commonwealth of Australia, June 1999, p. 17, . Accessed May 2001.74 Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, 'Report to the Minister for Defence on The Collins ClassSubmarine and Related Matters, Commonwealth of Australia, June 1999, pp. 6-10, . Accessed May 2001.75 By way of example, leakage from the propeller shaft seal was a manufacturing error and had beenfixed some years prior to the report and satellite communications were not part of the technicalrequirements until after July 1999.76 Hans J. Ohff, personal communication, 22 May 2001.