New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 31Both the ADF and the Defence Department continued to consider thepossibilities. In 1997 the Department of Defence commissioned a $1.5 million studyto ascertain the appropriateness of the cruise missiles for the Collins. As a longrange precision strike weapon, the Tomahawk can be armed with either a nuclear orconventional warhead. Launched from either surface ships or submarines,conventionally loaded it could range up to 1,000 miles and 1,500 with a nuclearpayload. The US claimed a critical role for the subsonic Tomahawk in OperationDesert Storm in 1991, Iraq in 1993, Bosnia in 1995, Iraq again in 1996, 160 and inOperation Southern Watch in the Persian Gulf in 1998.It is also worth contemplating that deployment of the Tomahawks on theCollins could also provide the Department of Defence with a substitute for thepurchase of a replacement for the F111 fleet. Although provisions were made in theDefence Capability Plan for acquisition of new aircraft to replace both the F/A-18 andF111, the government reserved the right to ‘examine its options'. 161 And examine itsoptions it did. Once again the government had made the decision to sign onto thenew US Joint Strike Fighter project. 162 While installation of the Tomahawks couldcertainly be an attractive cost reduction measure for the government, undoubtedly, itwould be contested by the RAAF. Arguably the F111s as a mobile platform, witheffectiveness as a visible threat deterrent, were the more appropriate vehicle for theTomahawks. The aircraft, however, would need to be pre deployed in order to matchthe range advantage offered by the submarines. 163 The F-35 Joint StrikeFighter(JSF) decision too, with its long lead times, has left some questions as to thecontinuity of air capability for Australia and the possibility of a five year gap in strikecapacity. 164Cruise missiles in the Asia Pacific theatre, however, were a delicateproposition. Gareth Evans postulated in 1987 that the degree of destabilisationcreated by the US deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles was a moot point. 165But Des Ball was in no doubt of the implications of its presence. 166 Ball's contentionwas also echoed by former head of US strategic armed forces, General Lee Butler,who also realised the threat of a regional arms race should Australia purchase theTomahawk. 167Eventually too, it became evident that over the Howard government’s tenure,procurement of defence technology and weaponry was increasingly oriented to USsystems and suppliers. Not only did the government announce its intention to joinPower Centre, Canberra, 2001, particularly pp. 106-124. See also Mark Forbes, ‘Subs chief calls forcruise missile strike power’, The Age, 30 January 2004.160 United States Navy, ‘Fact file: Tomahawk Cruise Missiles’, 11 August 2003, . Accessed September 2003.161 Replacement of both the F/A-18 and F111 had a project cost between $9-18 billion. Department ofDefence, 'Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force', Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2000, p.87, and Robert Garran, 'Defence divides cabinet', The Australian, 19 September 2000, p. 1.162 See Aldo Borgu’s comments in, Geoffrey Barker '$12 billion to buy experimental war plane',Australian Financial Review, 28 June 2002, pp. 1 and 18. Also Aldo Borgu, ‘The Defence CapabilityReview 2003: A Modest and Incomplete Review’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003, pp. 9-11.Also Geoffrey Barker, 'Howard's non-reality trip', Australian Financial Review, 15 July 2002, p. 62.163 Mark Forbes, ‘Subs chief calls for cruise missile strike power’, The Age, 30 January 2004.164 Aldo Borgu comments on the possibility of a serious strike capability gap in Cameron Stewart,‘Reach for the Sky’, The Australian, 6 December 2003, p. 19.165 Senator Gareth Evans, CPD, Senate Hansard, ‘Northwest Cape: Communications with Submarines',Question on Notice, No. 619, 18 February 1987, p. 216.166 Cruise missile deployment, however, was but one of Ball's concerns for regional security. Heregarded acquisition of new armament technologies such as the purchase of ballistic missiles andweapons of mass destruction as 'disturbing' features of regional security. See Des Ball, 'StrategicPlanning for the Defence of Australia in 2015', in Desmond Ball, (ed.), Maintaining the Strategic Edge:The Defence of Australia in 2015, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 133, SDSC, RSPac,ANU, Canberra, 1999, p. 8.167 Stephen Spencer, 'US expert warns against Tomahawk purchase', AAP Newsfeed, 7 October 1997