New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

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Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 38the vulnerabilities of Australia’s economic profile. 207 Public support of the ongoingproject by government and an ongoing commitment to its workforce, in both industryand navy, would thus seem not only desirable but responsible. Yet politicalobjectives remained paramount.At stake in this clearly, were both Commonwealth and State politicalinterests as a result of the sale's direct personal and social impact. Election results inWA and Queensland, together with the results of the Federal by-election in Ryan,Queensland, starkly revealed an electorate deeply dissatisfied with governmentalmanagement strategies. Any scent of a further mishandling of the much publicisedspectre of 'globalisation', in an ASC dismembering of the 900 skilled workforce inAdelaide, would directly impact on both the Coalition's Federal and South Australianelection prospects with elections anticipated in the latter half of 2001 for both.Nevertheless, if a rationalisation of the shipbuilding industry in Australia shouldrequire Tenix to relinquish its Williamstown dockyards for the Osborne site, thensimilar employment, social and economic concerns would confront Victoria. Stategovernments too, were active participants in the process, and sought to representtheir respective interests, including those decided in upcoming elections. SouthAustralian Premier, John Olsen, turned to Electric Boat, in endeavouring to ensurethat the state's defence and electronics industries would be preserved and developedthrough the establishment of a regional base for the US company. 208xiv. Domestic Management: The Opposition SubmergedClearly the political contours of this project exemplify the intricacies of thegovernment’s interest in managing threat on two different levels. That the Ministerfor Defence in 1999, John Moore, could publicise the McIntosh-Prescott Report 209 forboth domestic party political gain and to orient greater US involvement in the projectis demonstrative that the government was intent on managing threat on two differentlevels, both international and domestic. Elsewhere I have argued that thisgovernment sought US assistance because of the way it perceived threats. As aresponse it sought solace with its traditional allies. 210 And in the construction ofpolicy the Howard government needed to accentuate the ‘crisis dynamic’. FollowingCarol Johnson’s argument that the Coalition’s politics of reassurance wasnecessitated by a crisis of the position of the Anglo identity, 211 I contended that inforeign policy, the failure of public emphasis of the US alliance by the previousgovernment, was used by Howard to effect greater domestic political support. Here, Iargue that John Moore’s actions in establishing and utilising the McIntosh-PrescottReport constitutes a demonstration of the government’s interest in furthering ties withits traditional ally in addition to a specific policy manifestation of the deployment ofthis crisis dynamic. Moore managed this report, not only to disparage Beazley Laborbut also both to prompt and then defend greater intimacy with the US.207 See Stephen Bell’s account of Australia’s predicament in, Ungoverning the Economy: The PoliticalEconomy of Australian Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, particularly ‘Problemswith Australia’s Economic Structure’, pp. 82-85.208 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Nuclear shipbuilder may set up in SA', ABC News Online, 31July 2000, < http://www.abc.net.au/news/business/2000/07/item20000731105420_1.htm >. AccessedMay 2003.209 Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, 'Report to the Minister for Defence on The Collins ClassSubmarine and Related Matters, Commonwealth of Australia, June 1999, p. 6, . Accessed May 2001.210 Maryanne Kelton, ‘More than an Ally’? Australia-US Relations since 1996’, PhD thesis currentlyunder examination, School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University, February 2004.See Chapter Two on threat perception in recent Australian foreign policy in particular.211 Carol Johnson, Governing Change: Keating to Howard, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia,2000, pp. 6-7. Also Carol Johnson, ‘The dilemmas of ethnic privilege: A comparison of constructions of’British’, ‘English’ and ‘Anglo-Celtic’ identity in contemporary British and Australian political discourse’,Ethnicities, vol. 2, no. 2, 2002, pp. 164-188.
Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 39It has been observed that one of the central problems an Australiangovernment faces in naval shipbuilding is to find a balance ‘between oftenirreconcilable pressures.’ 212 Certainly a tension between a desire for a moreindependent strategic posture and one that asserted the centrality of the US alliancehas emanated from the handling of the Collins project. Explicit in this project havebeen the problems that have arisen as the government attempted to mediatebetween the production of an effective submarine platform and its desire both toexert its role in the success of the project and to affirm the US alliance. This wasclearly evident two days prior to the 2001 federal election. Former Minister forDefence, Peter Reith, argued at a business lunch in Adelaide that the Collins were‘six reasons why Kim Beazley shouldn’t be allowed in The Lodge.’ Later that sameday at the launch of Rankin he praised the ASC for ‘its remarkable achievement’.The ‘Rankin and her sister submarines will keep Australia at the forefront ofsubmarine technology’. 213 The politicisation of the project was similarly evident inthe continued criticism of the then Leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley, Reith hadearlier stated that,(m)ost Australians will remember he is the man who is responsible for the Collinsclass submarines and we are still trying to fix up the problems that he created at avery significant cost to the taxpayer. 214Clearly, through further criticism of the Collins submarine project, theCoalition could target Beazley. As Beazley had enjoyed popular support for much ofthe pre-election period up until early September 2001 it was vital that he beneutralised electorally. As John Moore had so effectively publicised any fault in thesubmarines previously, Reith could reasonably expect that discrediting Beazleythrough this project would be successful. 215 Thus, both John Moore and Peter Reithin their public rhetoric to rectify the ‘dud subs’ had acted to allay the domestic threatand sustain the Coalition’s incumbency. Former ASC Managing Director, Hans J.Ohff, pointed to government intrusion in the project for this reason and cited JohnMoore’s tenure as Defence Minister as the ‘most difficult time in the life of theproject.’ 216 One question worth asking here, is the whereabouts of the SouthAustralian State government in defending the project during this time. It can beassumed only that deference to the agenda of their Federal colleagues may havetaken precedence over any reasonable defence of the project.These domestic party politics also exacerbated by some of the politicalmanoeuvrings within the armed forces. The $5 billion outlaid for the submarinesjeopardised other projects. Funds for other weaponry such as the new air warfaredestroyers, amphibious transport ships and replenishment ships were endangered bythe massive outlay for the submarines. Other armed services projects were also atrisk via the costs of the Collins project. These included the air force replacement forthe F111 and F-18’s, the $3.5 billion Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)212 Mark Thomson, ‘Setting a Course for Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry’, A Presentation to theMaritime Building, Repair and Maintenance Conference, 26-27 March 2003, p. 10. Paper accessed viathe Australian Strategic Policy Institute.213 Terry Plane, ‘Reith shows two faces in one day on Collins subs – Election 2001: 2 days to go’, TheAustralian, 8 November 2001, p. 3.214 The Hon. Peter Reith, MP, Minister for Defence, transcript of the doorstop interview, Melbourne, 6October 2001, Media Release, MIN 412/01, p. 2.215 See, by way of example, the following criticism of the Collins as linked to Beazley: The Hon PeterReith, Minister for Defence, ‘Kim Beazley’s Record’, Media Release, MIN 410/01, 6 Oct 2001, p. 2. TheHon Peter Reith, Minister for Defence, ‘Kim Beazley – Not a Good Defence Minister’, Media Release,MIN 425/01, 1 Oct 2001, p. 3.216 Hans J. Ohff quoted in Robert Garran, ‘Sub deal sinks beneath US secrecy’, The Australian, 20December 2001, p. 2.
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