New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 26In May 2000, US company, Raytheon (RTNA/RTNB), had acquired Boeing'snaval systems division. Raytheon had been working with Boeing to solve the combatsystem problems but with the announcement that the system was to be replaced,Raytheon considered it better placed to have assumed Boeing's work on the projectand established a skill base and infrastructure centre in its new base in North Ryde,Sydney. 133Raytheon's Combat Control System (CCS) Mk2, the combat system currentlyutilised by the USN submarine fleet, would form the basis of their tender system forthe Collins. Proponents of this system argued that in choosing the CCS Mk2, theRAN would have access to a pre-eminent level of technology and a large parentnavy. Moreover, this presented the RAN, not only with assistance in the event ofdifficulties, but with the prospect of access to a defined growth path in thedevelopment of new technology. Its proponents then continued, and continue, toargue that the desirability of belonging to the networked US system was preferable toany system that operated in isolation. 134 Advantages of joint training were alsoidentified. Arguably too, the CCS Mk 2, in addition to providing command decisionaid for current weapon employment, offered a growth path for Tomahawk cruisemissile acquisition. Deflecting criticism that the CCS was an unproven derivative of asystem for the larger nuclear powered boats, Raytheon made much of its combinedefforts with the USN to adapt the system for the smaller crew of the Collins. In this,the human/machine interface (HMI) had been adapted to suit the Collins. 135 It wasalso contended that as the CCS had been subject to the US operational andtechnical evaluation process, it had then undergone a rigorous and comprehensivetesting process. 136 While this may certainly have been true of the system designedfor the US nuclear attack submarines, it was inescapably evident that the system forthe Collins remained untried and embraced a different philosophy. If a genericsystem could be used as the basis for the Collins CCS, there was still the issue ofrisk in its adaptation for the conventional submarines. Specifically, it appeared asthough the major challenges for Raytheon would be in the interface of the new CCSwith the current Collins technology systems, particularly the sonars. Moreover, theCCS needed to operate in a much smaller boat staffed by a smaller number ofsailors.Peter Briggs too, had observed that Australia was not the first to 'wade intothis swamp', both the Americans and the British had experimented with the creativeprocess in combat system production. 137 Both eventually reverted to more reliableadaptations of commercial off the shelf technology (COTS). 138 John Moore statedthat,(t)he combat systems of the British and American submarines went through anevolution not dissimilar to this…The difference is that they cut their losses a lotearlier than we did, abandoned that route effectively…' 139133 Eric Abetz, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence, 'Abetz opens Raytheon's new navaland engineering centre', Media Release, Parlsec 289/00, 13 October 2000.134 Information from interviewee.135 See Raytheon's presentation at the 2000, Undersea Technology Conference, Sydney.136 Terence Roach, former submariner and defence sector consultant, argues the case for the CCS Mk2 in 'Opportunity knocks for the Collins class', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, October/November 2000,pp. 38-39.137 Transcript of Press Conference, Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, Head Submarine Capability Team,Russell, Canberra, 23 July 1999, p. 14.138 John Moore, Minister for Defence, 'John Moore on the Collins Class fiasco', interview transcript, 7.30Report, ABC Television, 1 July 1999. It should also be noted that COTS technology is not without itsown difficulties, such as the procurement of spare parts in service processes.139 John Moore, Minister for Defence, Transcript of the press conference on the release of the McIntosh-Prescott Report, 1 July 1999, pp. 5-6, < http://www.minister.defence.gov.au//1999/mt0499.html >.Accessed May 2001.