New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 30during the course of the venture. This project, however, was subject to significantgovernment and public investigation and criticism, some contrived and unwarranted.Both could serve to disparage the Labor Opposition who instigated the project.Moreover the venture partners were given little recognition for their managementand/or resolution of the problems experienced. Their difficulties were compoundedby Rockwell’s inability to deliver the required combat system technology. Attendantto this was the Howard government’s interest, since its election in 1996, in upgradingthe US alliance. Any politicisation of the project in the domestic arena could alsoserve to create the space for a supposed US function in ‘resuscitating’ the venture.Whilst the US could contribute some expertise, its ‘messianic’ role was hotlycontested, particularly as it had no recent experience in the construction ofconventional submarines. Also running parallel to the exigent Australian politicalenvironment was the appeal of the diesel electric submarines for the USpredominantly from a force structure perspective. From this point I continue toexplore the consequences of these decisions and also those of procurement of UStechnology and weaponry. First, I contemplate the purchase of Tomahawk missilesfor the Collins.As an adjunct to the prospective purchase of the new combat system, it isinteresting to note that the manufacturer of the new generation Tomahawk missile,the Tactical Tomahawk, for the US Navy, was Raytheon. The new missile, a moreversatile, cheaper version complete with inbuilt reconnaissance and re-targetingcapability, enabled real time intelligence gathering and battle damage assessment.Mission planning now was not just limited to pre-battle preparation. Raytheon's initialcontract was allocated in 1998. This was followed up in 1999 with a further contractto re-manufacture up to 624 missiles configured with the new Block III globalpositioning satellite guidance capability, complementing the Terrain ContourMatching (TERCOM) and Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC)guidance. 155 It appeared then that was well able to argue its primacy shouldAustralia enter into a new phase of armament policy.Although the deployment of cruise missiles remained as one of the ongoingdebates in the ADF, it became more prominent, and possible, in the mid 1990s withthe relaxation of US embargoes on the export of the missiles. In exporting theTomahawk missile to the UK in 1995 for its Trafalgar class nuclear submarines, theUS signalled its preparedness to sell the missile to close allies. 156 This createdrenewed interest in Australia, particularly with a change of government, in acquiringthe weapon for the Collins class submarines. Commander Peter Sinclair,(commander of Collins), expressed his support for the Tomahawk, '(a)s a strategicweapon, Australia should enter the year 2000 with that sort of capability. 157 (TheCollins weapons discharge system and combat system would allow for the utilisationof the Tomahawk if approved.) 158 Even though by 1997 the acquisition of theTomahawk sea launched cruise missile (SLCM) for the Collins was eventuallyexcluded by the defence framework document in 1997, its currency neverdisappeared. 159155 Raytheon, 'US Navy Awards Raytheon $414 Million to Remanufacture Tomahawk Cruise Missiles',News Release, Media Relations, Arlington, Virginia, < http://www.raytheon.com/press/1999/jul/thawk >.Accessed May 1999.156 In 1995 the UK signed a Foreign Military Sales Agreement with the US for the purchase of 65missiles. After testing procedures it was pronounced operational in 1998.157 John Lonhardt, 'Australia considers Tomahawk', International Defence Digest, vol. 29, no. 10,October 1996, p. 13.158 A.W. Grazebrook, 'Collins class comes up down under', Jane's Navy International, vol.103, no. 1, 1January 1998, p. 21.159 Military analyst, Lee Willett, examines the arguments for the Tomahawk for Australia and assessesthe appropriateness of the Collins as a platform, in ‘Land Attack Missiles for Medium Navies’, in DavidWilson, (ed.), Maritime War in the 21 st Century: The Medium and Small Navy Perspective, RAN Sea