New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 22(a)nti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel submarines, and advanced mines couldthreaten the ability of US naval and amphibious forces to operate in littoral waters.New approaches for projecting power must be developed to meet these threats. 107The US too, was attracted to the rationalism of Australia's two ocean policy.In upgrading the WA naval base HMAS Stirling and relocating the submarine fleetthere, the Australian government had five objectives in mind. First, Neutral Baywould not be able to accommodate the Collins, and any east coast location imposedadditional time constraints upon the submarines’ usual operational tasks. Second, itcould more easily facilitate its sovereign responsibilities (and later assertiveness),with regard to the Cocos and Christmas Islands in the Indian Ocean, Heard andMacDonald Islands in the Southern Ocean and as it became more acutely consciousof, in 1999, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, south of Timor. Third, it could oversee theIndian Ocean sea lines of communications, where over fifty per cent of Australia'sseaborne trade, by displacement, was carried. Fourth, the Navy had more readyaccess to the Northwest shelf, which harboured extensive offshore oil and gasresources. 108 Fifth, this RAN initiative was premised on both logic and economicviability. Australia’s strategic interests would be best served through therelocation. 109 Although the US Navy's base in Diego Garcia established its presencein the Indian Ocean, with instability in both in South Asia and Southeast Asia in 1999,the need to fortify its presence and influence in the Indian Ocean and sea routes toSouth and Northeast Asia was emphasised. Shoring up its links with the AustralianNavy's resources was one method of ensuring this.viii. American RecognitionHorden Wiltshire, former Commanding Officer of HMAS Sheean, has recorded of theCollins submarines that the ‘media smoke screen has disguised the full potential ofthe platform which, in an uncertain strategic environment, remains one of the mostversatile and potent in the Australian Defence Force’. 110 The US too were soon todiscover just how potent. More positively for those associated with the Collinsproject, such was the lauded but little reported, success of HMAS Waller at theRIMPAC 2000 naval exercises off Hawaii in May, that the US interest washeightened. Despite being restricted by some aspects of its noise performance andlimitations in the combat system, Waller, in these structured events, pursued and'sunk' a Los Angeles class nuclear submarine and in taking periscope photographs ofthe aircraft carrier, Abraham Lincoln, demonstrated that it could enter into torpedorange of the carrier denying detection. 111 Just why there was such a dearth ofpublicity surrounding Waller’s success may indicate further, the strength of theinterest in securing US involvement.Importantly here, Waller operated with the original combat system as modifiedby Australian subcontractor, SonarTech and the original Kockums platform. 112 It didnot utilise either of the two augmentation systems proffered by the US, nor operate107 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington DC, 30 September2001, p. 31. Italics in original. See also Clark A. Murdock, ‘The Navy in an Antiaccess World’, in Sam J.Tangredi, (ed.), Globalization and Maritime Power, Institute for National Security Studies, NationalDefense University, 2001, Chapter 25.108 Sam Bateman, 'Australia's "two ocean" policy', Business Times, 29 July 1995, p. 4.109 I am grateful to some of the interviewees for the information in this section.110 Horden Wiltshire, ‘Submarines: an Australian view’, in David Wilson, Maritime War in the 21 stCentury: The Medium and Small Navy Perspective, RAN Sea Power Centre, Canberra, 2001, p. 257.111 Robert Garran, 'A deadly exercise in stealth', The Weekend Australian, 23-25 December 2000, p. 1.See also 'RAN Collins submarines now on track', Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, December/January2001, pp. 12-13. And, Andy Millar, ‘The Collins is a first rate sub’, Canberra Times, 7 June 1999.112 One of the interviewees has noted that the constant problems with the TDHS ‘robbed the submarineof even more success on several occasions’.