New Depths in Australia-US Relations: The Collins Class ...

Maryanne Kelton: New Depths 17Report also enabled the augmented combat system to be replaced prior to anyeffective trial and evaluation. 77Founded on the relationship between Vice Admiral Don Chalmers and USN,Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, Chalmers instigated the processwhereby US assistance was sought. Early in 1998, Australia’s then Chief of Navyand Admiral Jay Johnson, convened to discuss a range of issues, the Collins beingone of those. 78 Even if the ASC and some others involved in the project were notseeking US assistance, the USN CNO’s response to assist the RAN was accepted.As discussed later, the Collins project was, afterall, of interest to the US. On 10September 2001 in the Pentagon, Vice Admiral David Shackleton and US AdmiralVern Clark signed the Statement of Principles for Submarine Cooperation. BothJohn Howard and US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, were present at thesigning. Upgraded relations with the US and greater cooperation with the USN wereregarded as desirable by the Coalition. As argued in the thesis, greater intimacy wasintegral to the government’s management of threat and played to its domesticaudience as much as allaying any international risk.v. Combat System SnagsWhile in September of 1993, the ASC notified both Rockwell Ship Systems Australia(initial principal contractor for the system), and the Department of Defence of thecontract default on the combat system, allowance was made by the RAN andDepartment of Defence for Rockwell to continue and with segmented delivery steps.However, when politically it was necessary for the HMAS Collins to be 'provisionallyaccepted into service' in July 1996, the combat system was not performingoptimally. 79 The ASC regarded Rockwell not only as failing to deliver the contractedtechnology but that it was also unlikely to do so in the future. From 1993, RANpersonnel managed the company's continued difficulties with delivery. Why did theCommonwealth persevere with the system? It is possible that once theCommonwealth had agreed to the fixed price contract it was unwilling to outlayfurther funds, or to do so was politically difficult. Moreover, some involved may havefeared that after 1996 the Howard government would have shelved the project if it didnot appear to be successful. Furthermore, modifications wrought by those involvedin the project had kept the boats functioning and crews continued to be trained.Concurrently, the Maritime Systems division of DSTO had established the CombatSystem Research Centre in Adelaide to best manage the ongoing issues. Apracticable solution to the combat system was achieved that enabled the submarinesto function very effectively, if not perfectly, as the ASC, the RAN and Kockums wouldhave wished.For the Collins project, the difficulties in realising the optimal aims for thecombat system have been the crux of the issue and consequently, a key factor in thedetermining the success of the entire project. In part, the issue of the combat systemhas been its complexity. The combat system intended to integrate five differentsystems previously operated as separate units. These were:1) the navigationprocess, including the speed, depth and position information utilised in the77 Information from Interviewee.78 Information from Interviewee.79 Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, 'Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins ClassSubmarine and Related Matters', June 1999, pp. 10-12. See also Gary Brown, ‘Decades of Disasters:Major Project Management in Defence’, Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs,Defence and Trade, July 2002, p. 4. Brown sympathised here with the ASC as prime contractor in beingsubject to the customer’s demands for it to persevere with the combat system house despite the default.The Australian National Audit Office Report of 1992 also remarked upon the ASC’s withdrawal of profitsprior to the launch of Collins. The Commonwealth of Australia, Audit Report No. 22, 1992-93, NewSubmarine Project, AGPS, 1992.