MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM
2015 Global Terrorism Index Report_0_0
2015 Global Terrorism Index Report_0_0
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colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam<br />
Hussein’s air defence force. Also known as<br />
the “Lord of the Shadows”, he meticulously<br />
designed the original structure of ISIL. His<br />
master plan represents the source code of<br />
how to create and run an “Islamic<br />
Intelligence State” resembling the Stasi, East<br />
Germany’s notorious domestic intelligence<br />
agency. 4 The plan articulates how to recruit<br />
followers, how to identify sources of income,<br />
and how to target influential families and<br />
military opponents. ISIL is also resultsoriented:<br />
it has articulated its strategic goals,<br />
complete with a 2020 vision and 14 key<br />
indicators that measure its monthly<br />
performance and investments from region to<br />
region. To emphasise its transparency and<br />
professionalism, it publishes an annual report<br />
which sets out its business strategy of terror<br />
and destruction, including specific<br />
investments, down to the cost of each<br />
suicide mission.<br />
<strong>THE</strong> ISIL BR<strong>AND</strong><br />
Moreover, ISIL has effectively managed its<br />
strategic branding. It uses online media tools<br />
to disseminate its vision of the caliphate.<br />
Similar to a start-up business, it retains its<br />
competitive advantage with its al-Hayat<br />
Media arm which oversees several media<br />
divisions and provides each province content<br />
that pays tribute to fighters and extols<br />
battlefield exploits. Its strategic messaging<br />
and use of media as a psychological weapon<br />
in war is used tactically to magnify its power,<br />
attract foreign fighters and new citizens, and<br />
win greater economic resources. It has not<br />
only populated social media platforms but<br />
has attracted a global network of supporters<br />
that articulate, magnify and circulate its<br />
violent extremist messages worldwide. So far<br />
little has been done to counter the ISIL’s<br />
digital campaign. 5<br />
One of the most powerful tools of the ISIL is<br />
the creation of its brand and image, linked to<br />
the notion that it is a modern-day “caliphate”.<br />
By creating this notion, ISIL presents itself as<br />
the vanguard of militant Islam, the only<br />
legitimate jihadist movement to hold territory<br />
and govern a pseudo state. It claims to offer<br />
an “authentic” way of life different from<br />
secularism. The ISIL propaganda machine<br />
maintains that it is providing medical, social,<br />
policing, and rescue services and an effective<br />
administration. 6<br />
ISIL has attempted to preserve its public<br />
service personnel in their jobs through<br />
pre-existing governance structures. Some<br />
services are even financed by Baghdad, which<br />
has continued to pay public employees. ISIL<br />
profits from this arrangement by forcing state<br />
employees to give “zakat” a percentage of<br />
their salary. ISIL obligates financially capable<br />
Muslims to pay a sum of their money and<br />
assets to the Caliph’s treasury. ISIL has a Zakat<br />
Department which is responsible for collecting<br />
the fee, it claims to use the money for locals in<br />
need. A research paper published earlier this<br />
month by Aymenn al-Tamimi found that ISIL<br />
documents obtained from pro- and anti-<br />
Islamic State sources pointed to a<br />
“bureaucratic system with a level of<br />
complexity and professionalism that probably<br />
makes the Islamic State sustainable, even<br />
under containment.” 7<br />
The claim to be the true Islamic State has<br />
facilitated the group’s recruitment of<br />
Westerners, thousands of whom have<br />
flocked to join its ranks. The appeal to join is<br />
rooted deeper than just the romanticised<br />
rise of an Islamic fighting force; the<br />
caliphate is also appealing to more secular<br />
interests by advertising jobs, a regular<br />
monthly salary, a wife or husband, and in<br />
some cases even a home.<br />
ISIL maintains that the new “caliphate is all<br />
inclusive and allows Muslims to practice their<br />
religion without discrimination.” Even those<br />
with criminal or troubled pasts have the<br />
opportunity to become extraordinary<br />
overnight. ISIL’s appeal was captured in<br />
statement by Canadian foreign fighter Abu<br />
Muslim al-Canadi (André Poulin) in a<br />
September 2014 video released by ISIL.<br />
You know, there’s a role for everybody.<br />
Every person can contribute something to<br />
the Islamic State…If you cannot fight, then<br />
you give money, if you cannot give money<br />
then you can assist in technology, and if you<br />
can’t assist in technology you can use some<br />
other skills. 8<br />
ISIL’s military prowess is also attractive to<br />
many. ISIL leadership includes former officers<br />
in the military and intelligence services of the<br />
Sadam Hussein regime. ISIL’s military as of<br />
September 2015 has attracted approximately<br />
25,000 foreign fighters from over 100 different<br />
countries, including 4,500 Westerners. 9<br />
Foreign fighters bring with them new skills,<br />
and they are offered the highest salaries<br />
ranging from US$400-1,200 a month. 10<br />
Salaries are a magnet for attracting fighters in<br />
Syria: there are accounts that some Free<br />
Syrian Army fighters left their US$60 per<br />
month positions to join Jabhat al-Nusra group<br />
who offered US$300; ultimately they joined<br />
ISIL which offered the highest salaries,<br />
housing and career advancement. 11<br />
In addition to fresh troops, foreign fighters<br />
also provide ISIL with new income, either by<br />
depositing funds that are later accessed in<br />
areas near ISIL or by bringing cash. ISIL also<br />
solicits funds online via Skype and Twitter or<br />
via money remitters, and international<br />
prepaid cards. 12<br />
OIL<br />
Oil is the black gold of ISIL. As of September<br />
2015, ISIL controls 10 oilfields in Syria and Iraq.<br />
Oil wealth serves several purposes: it provides<br />
energy needs for the estimated 10 million<br />
civilians living in ISIL controlled territory and it<br />
helps fuel the war machine. More importantly,<br />
oil is used as a leveraging device to control its<br />
enemies. Many opposition forces are<br />
dependent on ISIL for diesel.<br />
ISIL sells most of its crude directly to<br />
independent traders at the oil fields in an<br />
organised system. Tankers queue for weeks to<br />
get access to the prized commodity. Estimates<br />
by local traders and engineers put crude<br />
production in ISIL-held territory at about<br />
34,000-40,000 barrels per day. The oil is sold<br />
at the wellhead for between US$20 and<br />
US$45 a barrel, earning the militants an<br />
average of US$1.5 million a day.13 The US<br />
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for terrorist<br />
financing stated that in a one month period<br />
earlier this year, ISIL made about $US40<br />
million off the sale of oil.14 A large portion of<br />
the money that ISIL raised from June 2014<br />
onwards came from oil fields and refineries.<br />
Oil is also a tool to launder money.15 Oil is<br />
smuggled throughout Iraq and Kurdistan and<br />
into Syria through a shadowy network of<br />
criminal operatives using desert routes and<br />
rugged mountains using trucks or donkeys,<br />
and through legitimate crossings for<br />
consumption in Turkey, Iran, and Jordan. Many<br />
of these were already established to<br />
circumvent the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq.<br />
If they are caught, poor border guards in Iraq,<br />
Syria, Iran and Turkey are bribed.<br />
Oil also allows ISIL to extort the regime of<br />
Bashar al-Assad. Gas supplies 90 per cent of<br />
Syria’s power grid on which ISIL and the Assad<br />
regime depend on for energy. ISIL controls at<br />
least eight power plants in Syria, including<br />
three hydro-electric facilities and the<br />
countries’ largest gas plant. Cooperation<br />
between ISIL and Syrian regime is strongest<br />
over gas that generates Syria’s electricity grid.<br />
GLOBAL <strong>TERRORISM</strong> INDEX 2015 | Expert Contributions<br />
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