doctrinal and ideological beliefs that were used to justify violence: Religious leaders were often engaged to publicly demonstrate the logical and moral errors in the rhetoric that was used to support the call to violence. These types of programs, often government-run, have however proven to be only partially successful. This is largely because the reasons why individuals join violent extremist groups are only ever partially about the ideology: The ideological narrative is the hook that draws the fighters in, but the narrative is how they are recruited, not why. The government-run de-radicalization programs in Singapore and Indonesia, for example, that target members of Jemaah Islamiyah, the group responsible for the attacks in Bali in 2002, showed limited success because these programs failed to address the reasons individuals engaged: search for meaning, belonging, or identity that came with being part of the cause, the opportunities membership offered, or a desire to seek justice or revenge for real and perceived grievances. Efforts to employ “formers” or “rehabilitated violent extremists” as spokespersons for prevention backfired in some cases because the formers never truly renounced their beliefs. Scholars who have studied the problem of violent extremism through a psychological lens have noted this challenge of cognitive dissonance in de-radicalization. Humans are unlikely to let go easily of beliefs that justify and support their behavior, especially extreme behavior. In fact, as some studies have shown, beliefs often change after our behavior changes, not the other way around. John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo, well-known researchers in this field, wrote in their 2008 book Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, that “some individuals are stripped of their radical views as a consequence of having left the group rather than that being a cause for leaving.” Saudi Arabia began a program to rehabilitate those fighters who had returned from fighting in Afghanistan shortly after 9/11. The program, housed in what is known as the Care Rehabilitation Center outside of Riyadh, emphasized de-radicalization sessions with clerics and psychological counselors, and also financially incentivized fighters to disengage in violence. The limitations of this program were highlighted in 2009, when Saudi authorities arrested nine of its graduates for rejoining terrorist groups. Two other former students of the program, both of whom had been imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, were found to have joined the Yemeni branch of al-Qa’ida. This led to an overhaul of the program that increased attention on addressing behavioral factors as opposed to the motivating beliefs and ideologies, emphasizing instead relationships and opportunities to rejoin society. The program that was started in 2008 and has graduated more than 3,000 returnees, now focuses on the returnees’ families and acknowledges the importance of social, familial, and national relationships in reintegrating foreign fighters. Peer and family relationships are key factors not only in shaping choices to join violent extremist groups in the first place but also in successful de-radicalization and reintegration efforts. Many of the youth who have traveled from Northern Europe have come from the same (often small) communities and social networks. In the city of Aarhus in Denmark, home to several dozen fighters, the East Jutland Police and Aarhus Municipality have spearheaded a reintegration program that emphasizes personal relationships and life skills. As profiled in an October 2014 Newsweek article, “the Danes are treating their returned jihadists as rebellious teenagers rather than hostile soldiers beyond redemption.” Returnees are given assistance in education, employment, and with repairing their relationships. Programs designed to disengage right wing extremists in Norway, Germany, and Sweden have also largely been considered successful because of their emphasis on family relationships, life skills, and a lesser focus on addressing the extremist ideology. These types of programs are rooted in the idea that reintegration into society is what will in time truly de-radicalize individuals and prevent them from engaging in violence again. These programs can offer individuals a second chance at life and the opportunity to turn in a different direction. These programs, where they exist, are an important corollary to accountable and fair law enforcement responses — not every returning foreign fighter is a terrorist attack waiting to happen. * This piece was originally published in Foreign Policy. GLOBAL <strong>TERRORISM</strong> INDEX 2015 | Expert Contributions 88
ANNEXES GLOBAL <strong>TERRORISM</strong> INDEX 2015 | Annexes 89
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MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMP
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 ABOUT
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The report highlights the striking
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Terrorism in Western Countries 3 Th
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In addition to this baseline defini
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RESULTS The 2015 Global Terrorism I
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40 Paraguay 4.094 50 Ethiopia 3.544
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DATE COUNTRY CITY FATALITIES / INJU
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TABLE 1 NUMBER OF YEARS A COUNTRY H
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INCREASING SPREAD OF TERRORISM One
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The country with the second largest
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AFGHANISTAN INCIDENTS 1,591 PROPERT
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PAKISTAN INCIDENTS 1,821 PROPERTY D
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INDIA INCIDENTS 763 DEAD 416 PROPER
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SOMALIA INCIDENTS DEAD 469 801 PROP
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THAILAND INCIDENTS DEAD 156 366 654
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FIGURE 8 CITIES WITH HIGHEST HOMICI
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TRENDS Over the last 15 years, more
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FIGURE 10 NUMBER OF ATTACKS AND DEA
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- Page 107 and 108: END NOTES 1. Global Terrorism Datab
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