MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

community to intervene, saying, “In the horror
that is Syria, the Yarmouk refugee camp is the
deepest circle of hell. ... A refugee camp is
beginning to resemble a death camp. The
residents of Yarmouk — including 3,500
children -- are being turned into human
shields.” 3 At the time, left out of the
conversation were the arguments suggesting
that another consequence may be the
radicalization (of those besieged) to ISIL’s
agenda, the very same argument politicians
and commentators are making today in
response to the steady stream of asylum
seekers entering Europe.
At the moment, it is the prospect of displaced
people becoming radicalized to the agendas
of violent extremists that is of growing
concern in Europe, and this concern applies
not just to displaced Syrians and Iraqis, but
also to transit migrants moving from
sub-Saharan Africa. The need for caution is
worth reiterating — in the majority of
situations providing security for the displaced
is far more important than securing our states
from them. Nevertheless there have been
examples where some IDP and refugee camps
have become recruiting grounds for violent
militant groups — as evidenced in certain
Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan (including
Jalozai near Peshawar, for example), or in
Somali refugee camps in Kharaz in Yemen.
While specific examples are unusual, there is
a more general risk that unless they are
better managed, IDP and refugee camps can
generate the conditions conducive to allow
for radicalization to violent extremism to
occur. Existing literature specifically
highlights three conditions that allow for this
— poor education (especially where the gap
is filled by violent extremist education), a
lack of work, and the absence of freedom of
movement. 4 These conditions are most likely
in protracted situations, where refugees
spend considerable periods of time in
camps; and unfortunately, the proportion of
refugees worldwide existing in protracted
situations is growing. 5
SHOULD WE FEAR TERRORIST
GROUPS WILL INFILTRATE
ASYLUM FLOWS?
This is perhaps the most electrifying question
in Europe today, as policymakers consider
resettling significant numbers of refugees
from the Middle East. As if their journey hasn’t
been arduous enough, in a number of
countries security screening is proving a
significant obstacle to their resettlement. Also
hampering the efforts of these desperate men,
women, and children in pursuit of safety or
opportunity, are what seems to be, a growing
number of overly cautious European leaders.
If you were to believe the statements offered
by some politicians, the conclusion is clear:
Migrants and asylum seekers pose a serious
risk to the security of Europe. President Milos
Zeman of the Czech Republic recently warned
of “sleeper cells” coming to Europe; Slovakia’s
Prime Minister Robert Fico predicted that the
current flow of migrants includes people
connected to terrorist groups; and Italian
Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni opined that
there is a “considerable risk” of terrorists
infiltrating immigration routes.
But in fact there is virtually no evidence to
support such assertions. Several smugglers
were interviewed last year by BuzzFeed and
reported having transported ISIL recruits. 6
One smuggler attested to having sent at least
ten ISIL fighters posing as refugees to Europe,
and affirmed that the fighters, once settled,
were awaiting their orders to launch an attack
on European soil. Two smugglers interviewed
in Turkey also reported transporting fighters
across the Mediterranean Sea. Without
underestimating how vital it is to manage any
such risk, we would observe that smugglers
may not be the most trusted source of
information, and in almost all other contexts
are routinely described as criminals and liars
by politicians and policymakers.
The ongoing European refugee crisis is, in any
case, too current to permit a credible
assessment in this regard. In most countries
data on terrorist activities is confidential.
However, where it is available, analyzing prior
waves of asylum seekers suggests that there is
very little evidence that during their journey,
their routes had been infiltrated or their
psyches co-opted by terrorists. The Migration
Policy Institute, for example, reported this
month that of 745,000 refugees resettled in
the United States of America since 9/11, only
two have been arrested on terrorism charges. 7
What is unclear however, is whether these
individuals were already radicalized to violent
extremism when they arrived, became
radicalized subsequently, or whether they
were deliberately sent to the United States by
terrorist groups.
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding short review of the evidence on
the linkages between migration and violent
extremism yields three main conclusions.
First, it is clear that there is a lack of evidence
on both sides of the argument. The need for a
better conceptual framework for
understanding drivers of displacement has
been highlighted. Data collection in IDP and
refugee camps remains limited and rarely
permits understanding of issues such as
radicalization to violent extremism. And while
data confidentiality on sensitive subjects like
radicalization to violent extremism is
understandable, it restricts much-needed
wider analysis from taking place. As such,
further research is required, but must be
carefully conducted in order to guard against
the risks of misperceptions or justifying
xenophobic attitudes or promoting similarly
narrow policies.
Second, this review has intentionally pointed
the way towards a number of policy
interventions. Violent extremism and
terrorism may not be the primary cause of
displacement for most people worldwide, but
certainly they are part of a complex set of
variables that force too many families to
abandon their homes. This suggests the need
for a more integrated approach to tackling
the root causes of displacement. A revised
and comprehensive approach would include
interventions specifically focused on
preventing and countering violent extremism.
Equally it suggests that coordinated efforts by
the international community to reduce
conflict, stabilize post-conflict settings, and
build peace, can prove relevant in preventing
and countering radicalization to violent
extremism. 8
While reiterating that in most cases IDPs and
refugees are populations at risk, rather than
populations that pose a risk, a second policy
implication concerns the need to focus on
measures to prevent radicalization to violent
extremist agendas among refugee
communities. Testimonials suggest that often
contributing factors to an individual’s pathway
toward radicalization (whether sympathizing
with a violent extremist agenda or going so
far as to participate in a violent act) is a lack of
opportunity and/or a perceived or actual
grievance. It is crucial that the international
community devote ample resources to ensure
that migrant and transit communities,
including those confined to camps, are
afforded as best access possible to the social
services and economic opportunities they
were deprived of in their home countries.
Education, employment, and freedom of
movement are essential interventions, along
with broader approaches to building
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