MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

doctrinal and ideological beliefs that were
used to justify violence: Religious leaders
were often engaged to publicly
demonstrate the logical and moral errors in
the rhetoric that was used to support the
call to violence. These types of programs,
often government-run, have however
proven to be only partially successful.
This is largely because the reasons why
individuals join violent extremist groups are
only ever partially about the ideology: The
ideological narrative is the hook that draws
the fighters in, but the narrative is how they
are recruited, not why. The government-run
de-radicalization programs in Singapore and
Indonesia, for example, that target members
of Jemaah Islamiyah, the group responsible
for the attacks in Bali in 2002, showed limited
success because these programs failed to
address the reasons individuals engaged:
search for meaning, belonging, or identity
that came with being part of the cause, the
opportunities membership offered, or a desire
to seek justice or revenge for real and
perceived grievances. Efforts to employ
“formers” or “rehabilitated violent extremists”
as spokespersons for prevention backfired in
some cases because the formers never truly
renounced their beliefs.
Scholars who have studied the problem of
violent extremism through a psychological
lens have noted this challenge of cognitive
dissonance in de-radicalization. Humans are
unlikely to let go easily of beliefs that justify
and support their behavior, especially
extreme behavior. In fact, as some studies
have shown, beliefs often change after our
behavior changes, not the other way around.
John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo, well-known
researchers in this field, wrote in their 2008
book Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and
Collective Disengagement, that “some
individuals are stripped of their radical views
as a consequence of having left the group
rather than that being a cause for leaving.”
Saudi Arabia began a program to rehabilitate
those fighters who had returned from fighting
in Afghanistan shortly after 9/11. The program,
housed in what is known as the Care
Rehabilitation Center outside of Riyadh,
emphasized de-radicalization sessions with
clerics and psychological counselors, and
also financially incentivized fighters to
disengage in violence. The limitations of this
program were highlighted in 2009, when
Saudi authorities arrested nine of its
graduates for rejoining terrorist groups. Two
other former students of the program, both of
whom had been imprisoned at Guantanamo
Bay, were found to have joined the Yemeni
branch of al-Qa’ida. This led to an overhaul of
the program that increased attention on
addressing behavioral factors as opposed to
the motivating beliefs and ideologies,
emphasizing instead relationships and
opportunities to rejoin society. The program
that was started in 2008 and
has graduated more than 3,000 returnees,
now focuses on the returnees’ families and
acknowledges the importance of social,
familial, and national relationships in
reintegrating foreign fighters.
Peer and family relationships are key factors
not only in shaping choices to join violent
extremist groups in the first place but also in
successful de-radicalization and reintegration
efforts. Many of the youth who have traveled
from Northern Europe have come from the
same (often small) communities and social
networks. In the city of Aarhus in Denmark,
home to several dozen fighters, the East
Jutland Police and Aarhus Municipality have
spearheaded a reintegration program that
emphasizes personal relationships and life
skills. As profiled in an October
2014 Newsweek article, “the Danes are
treating their returned jihadists as rebellious
teenagers rather than hostile soldiers beyond
redemption.” Returnees are given assistance
in education, employment, and with repairing
their relationships.
Programs designed to disengage right wing
extremists in Norway, Germany, and Sweden
have also largely been considered successful
because of their emphasis on family
relationships, life skills, and a lesser focus on
addressing the extremist ideology. These
types of programs are rooted in the idea that
reintegration into society is what will in time
truly de-radicalize individuals and prevent
them from engaging in violence again. These
programs can offer individuals a second
chance at life and the opportunity to turn in a
different direction. These programs, where
they exist, are an important corollary to
accountable and fair law enforcement
responses — not every returning foreign
fighter is a terrorist attack waiting to happen.
* This piece was originally published
in Foreign Policy.
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