The Litvinenko Inquiry
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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Litvinenko</strong> <strong>Inquiry</strong><br />
before, and Dr Shadrin’s evidence was that they may have had a meeting there prior<br />
to going out to dinner at the Pescatori restaurant.<br />
6.115 Dr Shadrin gave detailed oral evidence to the <strong>Inquiry</strong> about his relationship with<br />
Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun and the various meetings that he had with them in<br />
London during this period. 102 I also received oral evidence on this topic from several<br />
of Dr Shadrin’s colleagues – Nikolay Gorokov, 103 Dariya Davison 104 and Vladimir<br />
Voronoff. 105 <strong>The</strong> witness statement served by Mr Kovtun dated 2 June 2015 106<br />
addresses the business dealings that he and Mr Lugovoy had with these individuals.<br />
6.116 As I have indicated above, there is a good deal of uncontroversial evidence regarding<br />
Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun’s dealings with CPL. In the course of his oral evidence,<br />
Dr Shadrin explained in great detail how in 2005 CPL had obtained oil and gas<br />
exploration licences over blocks of land in Western Siberia. <strong>The</strong> licences had been<br />
purchased by raising funding in the London market. He went on to describe how the<br />
exploitation of these licences was subsequently put at risk by the actions of a group<br />
in Russia whom he variously described as ‘criminals’ and ‘raiders’.<br />
6.117 In summary, Dr Shadrin’s evidence was that this group, which was apparently led<br />
by a man named Mr Livshitz, attempted to cut CPL out of the exploration of the<br />
blocks of land by forging rival licences and bribing government officials. According<br />
to Dr Shadrin, CPL took two courses of action in response to this attack. <strong>The</strong> first<br />
(which was Dr Shadrin’s preferred course) was to challenge the forged licences in<br />
the Russian courts. <strong>The</strong> second, which Dr Shadrin said was insisted upon by the<br />
investors and by the CPL Chairman Mr Balfour, was to investigate and to attempt to<br />
put pressure on Mr Livshitz and his group. This led to the introduction of Mr Voronoff<br />
to the company. He, in turn, suggested that Mr Lugovoy and his company Ninth Wave<br />
should be instructed to assist. Mr Lugovoy appointed Mr Kovtun as Project Manager.<br />
Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were tasked with preparing a report on the Livshitz group.<br />
6.118 This general outline appears to me to be an uncontentious summary of the evidence<br />
of the various witnesses. What is of particular significance for present purposes is the<br />
stage that these matters had reached by the autumn of 2006.<br />
6.119 Dr Shadrin’s evidence was that the difficulties with the Livshitz group had been largely<br />
resolved by the summer of 2006.<br />
6.120 CPL had been successful in the domestic legal challenges that it pursued in Russia,<br />
both before the Arbitrazh Court and then the Court of Appeal. Following the decision of<br />
the Court of Appeal, the Ministry for Natural Resources had reissued CPL’s licences.<br />
All this had taken place by June 2006. 107<br />
6.121 With regard to CPL’s other line of attack, Dr Shadrin stated that Mr Lugovoy and<br />
Mr Kovtun had prepared and submitted their report by the end of July 2006, prior to<br />
which he had held two or three meetings with them in Moscow. He described their<br />
report in the following terms:<br />
102<br />
Shadrin 14/137-218<br />
103<br />
Gorokov 13/142-155<br />
104<br />
Davison 14/114-136<br />
105<br />
Voronoff 14/2-114<br />
106<br />
INQ021208<br />
107<br />
Shadrin 14/152-153<br />
134