The Litvinenko Inquiry

The Litvinenko Inquiry
4.60 The evidence of others who were close to Mr Litvinenko was to a similar effect.
4.61 Mr Goldfarb stated that Mr Litvinenko had told him sometime in early 2003 that he
was working for MI6; he added that, “he introduced me to one of them.” He said that
Mr Litvinenko had told him that he was consulting for MI6 on Russian organised crime
in Europe and travelling to various countries in the EU to assist their law enforcement. 60
4.62 Mr Berezovsky told the Metropolitan Police Service that Mr Litvinenko had worked for
what he described as “the intelligence service” and “the security services” (terms that
he appears to have used interchangeably), but added that he did not know any details
of his relations with them. He stated that:
“After he stopped working for me I understand he just kept working for the security
services. They paid him money to support himself and his family. … he later said
that he was disappointed with his working arrangements with the intelligence
service.” 61
4.63 There were others of Mr Litvinenko’s associates who appear to have been unaware,
prior to his death, that he had any possible connection with UK intelligence agencies.
Mr Reilly 62 and Mr Bukovsky 63 fall into this category.
4.64 I note that none of the witnesses from whom I heard and who knew Mr Litvinenko
during his life expressed the firm view that he did not have a relationship with UK
intelligence agencies.
4.65 The Home Secretary was a core participant in the Inquiry, acting in a representative
capacity for Her Majesty’s Government generally, as well as in her own right. Since
the factual issue was whether or not Mr Litvinenko worked for, or with, a government
agency, it would have been open to the Home Secretary to provide evidence
answering the point one way or another. No such evidence was provided in the open
session, and it was made clear that the Home Secretary neither confirmed nor denied
this allegation. Mr Garnham QC, who appeared on behalf of the Home Secretary,
explained the position in his opening statement, in the following terms:
“The very nature of the work of the agencies requires secrecy if it is to be effective,
and there is obvious and widely recognised need to preserve that effectiveness. It
has been, therefore, the policy of successive governments to neither confirm nor
deny (to NCND, in the jargon) assertions, allegations, or speculation in relation to
the security and intelligence agencies.
That means that, as a general rule, the government will NCND whether the
agencies are carrying out or have carried out an operation or investigation into
a particular person or group, have a relationship with a particular person, hold
particular information on a person or have shared information about that person
with any other agencies, whether within the UK or elsewhere.
In order to be effective, the NCND principle must be applied consistently, including
when no activity has taken place and a denial could be made perfectly properly.
If the government were prepared to deny a particular activity in one instance, the
inference might well be drawn that the absence of a denial in another amounted to
60
Goldfarb 5/128-129
61
Berezovsky 25/10; 25/12
62
Reilly 10/196
63
Bukovsky 26/94
64