The Litvinenko Inquiry

Part 4 | Chapters 1 to 6 | Why would anyone wish to kill Alexander Litvinenko?
confirmation of the alleged activity. If the government were forced to depart from
the NCND principle in one case, it would create a clear risk of serious harm to
essential UK national security interests. It could, furthermore, potentially put lives
at risk.” 64
Later in the opening statement, Mr Garnham quoted a passage from the judgment of
Lord Carswell in the Scappaticci case: 65
“To state that a person is an agent would be likely to place him in immediate
danger from terrorist organisations. To deny that he is an agent may in some
cases endanger another person who may be under suspicion from terrorists. Most
significant, once the government confirms in the case of one person that he is not
an agent, a refusal to comment in the case of another person would then give rise
to an immediate suspicion that the latter was in fact an agent, so possibly placing
his life in grave danger.
… If the government were to deny in all cases that persons named were agents,
the denials would become meaningless and would carry no weight. Moreover,
if agents became uneasy about the risk to themselves being increased through
the effect of government statements, their willingness to give information and the
supply of intelligence vital to the war against terrorism could be gravely reduced.
There is in my judgment substantial force in these propositions and they form
powerful reasons for maintaining the NCND policy.” 66
Mr Garnham concluded the statement by emphasising the consequence of the NCND
approach that the Home Secretary was taking:
“All that, sir, has an immediate consequence in the circumstances of these open
hearings. The failure of the government either to confirm or deny an assertion or
a suggestion about events under consideration in this Inquiry tells you precisely
nothing about the truth or otherwise of that assertion or suggestion. It means, sir,
you must look elsewhere to determine the truth or falsity of such allegations.” 67
4.66 So much for the question of what relationship Mr Litvinenko may actually
have had with the agencies, and what his family and friends understood
to be the position at the time. As I indicated above, for the purposes of this
Inquiry it is at least as important, perhaps more important, to assess what Mr Litvinenko’s
enemies thought he was doing. Did, for example, the FSB believe that Mr Litvinenko
was or may have been working with the UK intelligence agencies?
4.67 There is some evidence before me to suggest that that is precisely what the FSB
believed. The source of that evidence is Mr Lugovoy.
4.68 In public statements and interviews that post-dated Mr Litvinenko’s death, Mr Lugovoy
stated firmly not only that Mr Litvinenko had told him that he was working with MI6, but
that Mr Litvinenko had tried to recruit him as an MI6 agent. For example, at the press
conference that Mr Lugovoy gave (with Mr Kovtun) in Moscow on 31 May 2007, he
stated that, during meetings that he had held in London during 2006, Mr Litvinenko
had been involved in an attempt, “to try and recruit me openly as an agent for British
Intelligence.” Mr Lugovoy went on to describe what it was that, as he understood it,
64
Garnham 1/172-173
65
(2003) NIQB 56
66
Garnham 1/174-175
67
Garnham 1/178-179
65