The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

the Sino-Indian and the Sino-Russian borders, the land boundaries of the majority of regional
Powers are not contiguous. While recognising that in today’s world, air- and sea-power cannot
be considered separately, it is important to acknowledge that the Indo-Pacific is a maritime
strategic environment. As Robert Kaplan poignantly notes, “Europe is a landscape; East Asia a
seascape.” 193
Much of the discussion about the rise of Asia orbits the re-emergence of China, a potential peer
competitor of the US globally and very clearly an aspiring regional hegemon. With economic,
political and diplomatic interests that span the globe, Beijing has become, as one study noted, “a
fulcrum of change in the regional order.” 194 With its increasingly assertive policies, backed by
growing defence capabilities, the new China has unsettled the entire region, a situation that is
magnified by a lack of transparency regarding its ambitions. Many of the countries in China’s
strategic periphery, including India, Japan and Russia, all of which have smaller economies and
armed forces, are deeply concerned by the rapid transformation in China’s status. Few countries
in history have been so radically transformed in such a short space of time, and the speed with
which new asymmetries have emerged has unsettled longstanding assumptions about regional
affairs. These uncertainties in Asia are magnified by the relative decline in US power that raises
troubling questions for some governments about Washington’s willingness and ability to continue
to project sufficient power to maintain the status quo.
The Indo-Pacific obviously includes, however, more than the East Asian archipelago, and the
presence of other Powers with their own national ambitions contributes to the strategic
uncertainty that now characterises international politics in Asia. Having long ignored Asia as a
pillar of its foreign policy, Russia knows that its survival as a major Power requires it to play a
more active role in the region or risk marginalization. Anxiously trying to build closer
relationships with Asian governments, Moscow is determined not to fall further behind either
Beijing or Washington in their efforts to exercise regional leadership. A lingering dispute with
Japan over the Kuriles and the ongoing war in Ukraine have reduced, however, the attractiveness
of Russia for many Asian investors and governments. 195 Beyond providing access to its vast
natural resources, often at the cost of larger strategic interests, Russia has very limited means to
project power. Its military and naval capabilities are much diminished from those of the Soviet
era, and it lacks the capacity to play a stabilising role in regional security. The confrontation with
the West, and the unwillingness of the current regime to enact substantive economic reforms,
means that building up its military profile in Asian waters will prove very challenging. Doing so
will demand sacrifices from the Russian people that might not be sustainable.
Russia’s Asian policy is heavily influenced by domestic concerns—namely a regime eager to
manage the economic impact of Western sanctions alongside the need to protect its eastern
territories of Siberia and the Far East that are susceptible to economic and demographic pressure
from China. 196 With few other viable options, Russia has become dependent on its relationship
with China, especially as a market for energy exports that are a major source of government
193 Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron. The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, p. 5.
194 Evan S. Mederios, China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism and Diversification (RAND:
Santa Monica, 2009), p. 1.
195 Morena Skalamera, “Putin’s Asia Strategy for 2015”, Commentary (National Bureau of Asian Research:
Washington, D.C., December 2016), pp. 1–2.
196 Margarete Klein, Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power? (Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik: Berlin,
September 2014), p. 9.
40 DRDC-RDDC-2016-R085