The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

hitherto untapped treasure trove, Russian leaders are eager that their country benefit from the
enormous resources there, much of which lies within Russian territory, sovereign waters or the
EEZ. 277 Western economic sanctions and falling energy prices are undermining Russia’s ability to
afford its long-term aims. While they could delay Moscow’s timetable for the region, they appear
to be fortifying Russia’s resolve to advance its own Arctic development agenda.
Admittedly, the size of the deployments and the capabilities involved are far below Cold War
levels and the emergence of a harder line in Moscow’s Arctic policy was already evident before
the current tensions. As early as mid-2007, for example, Russia reintroduced long-range air
patrols over the Arctic Ocean. In 2008, the commander of the Russian Navy publicly mused about
the potential for a “redistribution of power up to armed intervention”, and the following year
Moscow’s declared Arctic policy emphasised securing sovereignty over its strategic resources in
the region and ensuring exclusive control over the NSR. 278 Five years later, following the rapid
deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West, Putin announced a much larger increase in the
military presence in the region in order “to have all the levers for the protection of its security and
national interests.” 279 Since then, the military buildup in the Arctic has continued with the
establishment of a new joint forces strategic command that is slated to include two mechanised
infantry brigades (by 2016), ten military airfields, and the integration of the Russian Navy’s
Northern Fleet. 280 And, in early-April 2015, Moscow conducted a large-scale parachute drop near
to the North Pole, an action that was likely intended to assert Russian maritime boundary
claims. 281 The harder policy line, as well as a presumed incursion of a Russian submarine in
Sweden’s territorial waters in mid-2014, threats made by Russia’s ambassador in Denmark in
early-2015 about that country’s participation in sea-based ballistic missile defence system, and
reporting that Russian officials are taking an increased interest in Norway’s coastal waters, are,
feeding a growing sense of unease. 282 This will almost certainly continue as the strategic
competition associated with a slowly emerging multi-polar system takes shape. As it does, the
importance of the Arctic as a strategic region—for power projection and as a bastion for Russia’s
sea-based deterrent—will steadily grow. As one commentator has written, “most analysts have
long concluded that the Arctic’s future would be dominated by economic development and
international cooperation, [but] thanks to Russia’s most recent behaviour in the region, such a
conclusion is no longer so certain.” 283
277 Pavel K. Baev, “Trouble-Making and Risk-Taking: The North in Russian Military Activities” in
Elana Wilson Rowe (ed.), Russia and the North (Ottawa University Press, 2009), pp. 21–25.
278 Hart et al., Chill Out, p. 4. See also Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy”, Joint Forces Quarterly,
Issue 57, April 2010, pp. 107–108.
279 “Putin orders Arctic military build-up in 2014”, RT.com, 10 December 2013 [accessed on
21 August 2014 at http://rt.com/news/arctic-russia-military-putin-000/].
280 “Transfer of Troops to the New Command in the Arctic Region will be Completed by December 15”,
ITAR-TASS, 10 December 2014, and Tim Ripley, “Russia to build more Arctic airfields”, Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 21 January 2015, p. 13.
281 “Machtdemonstration: Russische Fallschirmjäger landen auf Eisscholle in der Arktis“, Der Spiegel,
7 April 2015.
282 See, for example, Therese Doksheim, “Norwegian Police Intelligence Warned of Russian Information-
Gathering Along Norwegian Coast”, Dagbladet.no (Oslo), 28 February 2015.
283 Stephen Blank, “The Russian Arctic: Between Economic Development and Accelerating Militarization”,
Eurasian Daily Monitor, 7 November 2014.
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