The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

theorists that confronting a modern, well-equipped adversary in a littoral environment will be far
more dangerous than anything seen since the most intense naval engagements of the
Second World War. Being able to protect maritime forces in the littorals from conventional and
asymmetric attack and to insert, to protect and to recover forces ashore will in the future be key to
achieving strategic and operational objectives. Weapons systems to deal with threats to the
accomplishment of such aims, such as anti-ship ballistic missile defence and sea-based ballistic
missile defence, will become increasingly important. Indeed, ship-based ballistic missile defence
to protect naval vessels as well as forces ashore (i.e., theatre ballistic missile defence) will grow in
importance should weapons of mass destruction proliferate and are incorporated in war-fighting
doctrines. 399 “The constraints in [this] ‘ballpark’ are quite different from the ones that shaped the
development of most current naval force structures,” an Israeli admiral has warned. 400
6.6 The Impact of Technology
While every naval engagement is unique, it is axiomatic that technology and technological
advantage are important in influencing (to a greater or lesser degree) the outcome. The presence
of three heavily armed galleasses at Lepanto (1571) directly contributed to the Venetian-Spanish
victory as there was nothing comparable in the equally-sized Ottoman fleet. 401 The loss of
HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse at the Battle of Malaya (1941) demonstrated the qualitative
edge that Japanese bombers had over otherwise formidable warships. 402 In some cases, the
technological advantage can be very slim and yet still prove decisive. Before the Falklands
campaign (1982), the Royal Navy had endured budget cuts, creating vulnerabilities that were to
be tragically revealed in battle. However, its possession of advanced US missiles tipped the airto-air
battles in Britain’s favour and directly contributed to eventual victory. 403
Since the end of the Cold War, Western navies have become accustomed to operational
environments where they have deployed forces that have been markedly superior in technology. Most
often, commentators point to the development of advanced weaponry, such as precision-guided
munitions. Other, more commonplace technologies applied by armed forces have also marked
Western naval superiority. One of the most significant is that of global positioning systems and
other targeting aids. Using these, ships can fire missiles ashore at ranges in excess of 1,000 miles,
and from the safety of international waters. 404 As a consequence, the dangers associated with
having to closely engage an adversary have not been a major consideration for some years now.
In the future, however, naval planners will be increasingly confronted by widespread proliferation
of advanced and affordable technologies that will alter assumptions of armed engagements at sea.
The spread of technology, and often of advanced weapons (e.g., ballistic missiles and sea mines),
will continue to increase the risks to platforms of the traditionally more advanced navies at sea. This
will reduce the margins for operational and strategic error. The unexpected and disabling July 2006
attack by Hezbollah on the Israeli Navy missile ship (the INS Hanit) using an Iranian-supplied,
399 Till, Seapower – A Guide to the Twenty-First Century, p. 33.
400 Ya’ari, “The Littoral Arena: A Word of Caution”, p. 81.
401 John Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in
the 16 th Century (Conway Maritime Press: London, 2003), p. 245–247.
402 See Till, Understanding Victory, pp. 113–117.
403 See Till, Understanding Victory, pp. 153–155.
404 I am grateful to Cdr. Steve Thompson (RCN) for this argument.
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