The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

activity in the Arctic could precede adequate government control and regulation. This would
create a vacuum of effective authority and lawlessness, generating its own set of problems.
Cost-benefit assessments that take into account such possibilities are, therefore, necessarily
informing current policy planning for future maritime security needs in the Arctic.
All of the Arctic states continue to advocate peaceful development of the region, but some are
also augmenting their military presence in the region. Both Norway and Denmark, while
emphasizing resource exploitation and sovereignty assertion, have invested in the procurement of
new warships capable of operating in Arctic waters, and the latter has created an Arctic region
military command structure. 270 In late-2014, Stockholm asked Nordic Defence Cooperation
(NORDEFCO), an organization promoting military cooperation among Sweden, Finland,
Norway, Denmark and Iceland, to examine the feasibility of a modular Nordic-Baltic Battle
Group “to better protect strategic areas, such as the High North Arctic region and the Baltic Sea
area.” 271 More recently, in early-May 2015, Norway announced that it would spend an additional
US$500 million to improve its anti-air and armour capabilities for operations in the country’s
northern reaches. 272 Canada likewise wants to ensure that its armed forces have a more regular
and sustained presence in the region, and its navy is exercised each summer in Operation Nanook
in northern Baffin Bay. Canada’s Northern Strategy (2009) ties the reinforcement of the
country’s sovereignty in the Arctic to economic and social development, as well as protection of
the region’s sensitive ecology. 273 Until recently, however, the US has seemed to be a reluctant
participant in modern Arctic. 274 The US Navy’s interim document, Arctic Roadmap (2014), stated
that the “military threat environment in the Arctic Region has diminished significantly and the
risk of armed conflict in the Arctic region is projected to remain low for the foreseeable future.”
Any role for the USN in Arctic waters is described as being “in support of Coast Guard search
and rescue, disaster relief, law enforcement, and other emergency/civil support operations.” 275
This approach was maintained when, in April 2015, the US assumed the chairmanship of the
Arctic Council. However, the deterioration in US relations with Russia offers a possible
explanation why QDR 2014 notes that Arctic strategy is still under review.
While it is not the sole cause of the increased military activity in the high north, Russian policy is
the main driver of that trend. Russia is the most significant player in Arctic affairs, and its
realpolitik approach to world affairs (i.e., pursuit of power as a national interest and the use of
armed force) could dash any hopes over the next decade at least for the peaceful development of
the region. In recent years, the Arctic has become an important component of post-Soviet national
identity, and President Vladimir Putin has made frequent visits to the region. 276 Viewing it as a
270 Frederic Lasserre, Jérôme Le Roy, Richard Garon, “Is there an arms race in the Arctic?”, Journal of
Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 14, Issues 3 & 4, 2012, p. 10.
271 Gerard O’Dwyer, “Sweden Proposes Aggressive Nordic Defense”, Defense News (online), 10 February 2015
[accessed on 11 February 2015 at www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/02/10/
sweden-nordic-cooperation-russia-nordefco-cooperation-nbg-sreide-battlegroup/22865811].
272 Gerald O’Dwyer, “Norway adds $500M to Bolster High North”, Defense News, 4 May 2015.
273 Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy; Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (Ottawa, 2009), pp. 2–5.
274 Grace Jean, “US Coast Guard wrangles with ice breaker shortage”, Jane’s Defence Weekly,
4 March 2015, p. 10.
275 United States Navy, Task Force Climate Change, US Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 (Washington,
D.C., February 2014), p. 13.
276 Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Arctic Policy: Geopolitics, Mercantilism and Identity-Building”, FIIA Briefing
Paper 73, 17 December 2010, p.6.
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