The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

4.2 US Decline and Sino-US Competition 209
Since the defeat of Japan in 1945, the US has been the region’s hegemonic actor, able to project
overwhelming power to deter aggression and reassure allies. American power—military and
economic—has upheld the regional status quo. In recent years, however, the ability to sustain that
role has been called into question both by Washington’s domestic difficulties (indebtedness and
political polarization) and by the simultaneous rise of China. “What should be evident,” one
Australian academic has written, “is that the United States is moving away from its traditional
role of global security provider to that of security enhancer.” 210 This is interpreted to mean a more
cautious US policy toward international and regional security, working with partners (both
traditional and otherwise) and allies to develop defence capabilities in order to advance common
security objectives. While Washington has declared a continued willingness to maintain the
post-1945 order, its increased reliance on regional allies and partners is unsettling to many
governments. For some regional governments, it calls into question the reliability of
Washington’s extended deterrent and, implicitly, it enhances China’s strategic profile that China.
Policy-makers in Washington have acknowledged that the re-emergence of China as a Great
Power is the most significant long-term strategic challenge that the US faces both in Asia and
globally. 211 The roots of Sino-US competition lie in what appears to be a fundamental
incompatibility of many of the two countries’ strategic interests. 212 From Washington’s
perspective, Beijing is attempting to advance an agenda that threatens the regional status quo that
Washington has long upheld. “The underlying geo-strategic objective for the United States in
Asia and the Pacific,” a report prepared by a US think-tank observed, “has been to maintain a
balance of power that prevents the rise of any hegemonic state from within the region that would
threaten US interests by seeking to obstruct American access or dominate the maritime
domain.” 213 China, on the other hand, has been described as “an increasingly assertive, distinctly
non-status-quo power, attempting to rearrange the regional geopolitical order in its favour.” 214
The constraint imposed by its geography—a land Power with very long borders—has declined as
continental threats have lessened and maritime interests have grown. 215 This was most recently
underscored by Beijing’s most recent defence policy statement, entitled China’s Military Strategy
209 This section draws upon the author’s earlier publication, Determinants of US Strategic Policy in the
Asia-Pacific, DRDC-RDDC-2015-L034 (January 2015).
210 Alan Dupont, Full spectrum defence: Rethinking the fundamentals of Australian defence strategy
(Lowry Institute: Sydney, March 2015), p. 8.
211 The US and China look at the latter’s rise rather differently. Washington regards the rise of China as the
most significant geopolitical challenge it now faces. However, Beijing makes reference to “reclaiming” its
status as a major power through a policy of national rejuvenation. While many Western Powers might
interpret that as nationalist rhetoric, China’s outlook is far from ahistorical when one considers that it was
only after 1800 that Europe could be considered more industrialised. Before that time, China had accounted
for a greater share of world manufacturing output than Europe. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers (Unwin-Hyman: London, 1988), p. 149.
212 Guy Roberts, “Acknowledge and Commit, Disagree and Continue: US China Policy for the 21 st
Century”, Security Challenges, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2014, pp. 88–89.
213 Berteau and Green, U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region, p. 13.
214 Chris Rahman, “The Inescapable Ocean: On Understanding Australia’s Strategic Geography” in Jones
(ed.), A Maritime School of Strategic Thought for Australia, p. 70.
215 This argument is made in Michael A. Glosny and Phillip C. Saunders, “Correspondence: Debating
China’s Naval Nationalism”, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2, Fall 2010, p. 168.
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