The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

coast guard can sometimes provide greater flexibility to policymakers than would be the case
were naval forces deployed. China’s reliance on its large and capable coast guard to exercise what
are essentially constabulary functions in the East China Sea is one such example. It allows
Beijing to avoid military-to-military confrontations. 323 Non-military competition using coast
guards or maritime law enforcement vessels—e.g., between Japan and China over the disputed
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands—creates breathing room in times of heightened tensions, and prevents
inevitable escalation that would likely follow were naval forces engaged in this form of
brinkmanship.
For most countries, however, navies will retain an important or leading role in asserting (often
merely through presence) legitimate national authority in both sovereign waters and within EEZs.
Governments will also continue to use their navies as an instrument for cooperative diplomacy.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, such as those conducted in response to the
tsunami in East Asia (2004) or earthquake in Haiti (2010), are regularly used not only to alleviate
human suffering, but are also intended to augment a country’s soft power. 324 And, navies will be
used to forge coalitions to improve regional maritime domain awareness, as in North America or
among EU member-states, or to help develop essential maritime security capabilities among
less-developed countries. Described as partnership-centric, the latest version of the US
government’s maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21 st Century Seapower (2015),
places considerable importance on cooperative capacity building. In discussing the global role of
the USN it asserts, for example, that “[m]erging our individual capabilities and capacity produces
a combined naval effect that is greater than the sum of its parts. By working together in formal
and informal networks, we can address the threats to our mutual maritime security interests.
Maximizing the robust capacity of this global network of navies concept, we are all better
postured to face new and emerging challenges.” 325 This is, of course, the thinking behind such
USN-led multilateral exercises as Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and UNITAS, and multilateral
gatherings such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Enhancing national naval
capability through frequent international contact and cooperation also contributes to decisions by
countries to deploy naval assets in support of allies and/or partners (e.g., the UK naval task group
in the Arabian Sea). But it need not be multilateral, for governments will also use naval capacity
building to advance strictly bilateral relationships. In 2007, for example, China transferred nine
patrol boats to Cambodia only three months after Phnom Penh announced its intention to improve
the security of its offshore oil production facilities. The timing of this gesture was reportedly very
much appreciated by the Cambodian authorities. 326 While advancing foreign policy objectives,
support for maritime capacity building using navies can also be a key enabler in helping “to
provide greater maritime security as a building block for greater stability on land.” 327
323 See Ryan D. Martinson, “China’s Second Navy”, Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute,
April 2015, pp. 24–29.
324 Soft power can be defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our
policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.” Joseph S. Nye, Soft
Power. The Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affairs: New York, 2004), p. x.
325 A Cooperative Strategy for 21 st Century Seapower, p. 2. See also Sam J. Tangredi, “US Navy Efforts in
Supporting Partner Maritime Capacity Building: Refocusing a Tradition”, in Forbes (ed.), Maritime
Capacity Building in the Asia-Pacific Region, pp. 41–52.
326 Evans, “Enforcing Free Trade.”
327 Trelawny, “Maritime Security Beyond Military Operations: A Civilian Perspective”, p. 51.
68 DRDC-RDDC-2016-R085