The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

middle-Power navies will be unable to afford the large research and development expenses
associated with new weapons technologies, and they will probably wait to assess their operational
effectiveness by larger naval Powers. 424 But even for the largest navies, incorporation of new
technologies will be a function of technical insight, accessible expertise and institutional
adaptability, none of which is guaranteed to be present and all of which will nonetheless confront
the bureaucratic sluggishness for which all military institutions are notorious. 425 Even if a
technological innovation is recognized as valuable, navies will still need to adapt tactics to ensure
its most effective use; and that too could take considerable time and effort, with eventual success
far from certain. The ultimate test always will always be survivability in combat. Failure to
innovate could lead to inefficiencies in war-fighting and possible capability gaps, sometimes with
dire consequences. Nevertheless, the absence of any guarantee that the potential of existing or
new technologies will be understood and incorporated means that there will always be an element
of unpredictability concerning the relationship navies have with technological change.
6.7 The Importance of Interoperability
Interoperability at sea with allies and trusted international partners will be of increasing
importance as a key enabler for operational and strategic success in maritime warfare of the
future. The high-intensity, multi-threat environment that characterises contemporary naval
operations will also demand a range of capabilities beyond what most modern navies possess or
can afford to acquire. In 2012, the commander of the RCN, Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison, wrote
that “[m]aritime warfare will require fully integrated offensive and defensive joint action across
all physical dimensions in the maritime domain—from the seabed to space—as well as full use of
the electromagnetic and informational environments.” “[S]uch operations,” he added, “will
require far more than the bringing together of a coalition at the time of crises. They will require
ever-higher degrees of interoperability to effect a merging of allied and coalition maritime forces
at the technical, tactical and doctrinal levels…” 426
However, what theorists assert is required will likely not be achieved—at least not in terms of
technological interoperability. The goal of a networked coalition fleet will almost certainly
become more difficult to reach within the Western Alliance as the gap between the technology
deployed on US and non-US naval platforms expands. The cost of keeping pace with the USN
will be the principal reason. Leading naval Powers are already being forced to scale back earlier
expectations. For example, as a cost saving measure, the UK announced in June 2012 that it
would not be acquiring CEC for its newest warships. 427 While the decision was made for
budgetary reasons, it will likely have a strategic impact on UK foreign and defence policy,
undercutting the ability of Royal Navy ships to operate alongside the US Navy in high intensity
operations. 428 Other navies are facing a similar dilemma—whether to devote funds from already
424 I am grateful to Daniel Salisbury for this observation.
425 See, for example, Peter Marland, “Post-war Fire Control in the Royal Navy”, John Jordan (ed.), Warship
2014 (Conway: London: 2014), pp. 146–162.
426 Vice Admiral Paul Maddison, “Strategic Trust and Cooperation”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 65,
No. 4, Autumn 2012, p. 11.
427 Thomas Harding, “Cutting Missile system leaves warships at risk”, The Daily Telegraph, 9 June 2012.
428 “Lack of CEC Sensor Shooter Capability is a Major Error”, Warship – International Fleet Review (online),
27 June 2012 [accessed on 4 September 2014 at www.warshipsifr.com/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=94:lack-of-cec-sensor-shooter-capability-is-a-major-error&catid=36:commentary&Itemid=65].
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