The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

while the Chinese leadership remains focused on maintaining domestic political stability—no
mean task in such a large and populous country. 224 It may be, as some have argued, that Beijing
believes by “balancing economic and military development, [it] may rise to great power status
sustainably and with minimal foreign opposition.” 225 Likewise, most US policymakers (and most
likely those in China) understand that stability in Asia is a function of the Washington-Beijing
relationship. This includes confronting the threat of instability on the Korean peninsula where
China is acknowledged as the most effective interlocutor with Pyongyang.
There are, nevertheless, areas where significant bilateral tensions are proving intractable, with
potentially dangerous consequences for strategic stability. There are serious disagreements over
human rights issues and each other’s economic policies. Beijing categorically opposes
Washington’s leadership role in Asia, especially its relationship with Taiwan. US efforts to
reassure US allies through improved defence contacts and arms sales (particularly to Taiwan) are
viewed as threatening and frequently inflame Sino-US relations. 226 Moreover, China’s drive to alter
the regional status quo means that it has less of an interest in transparency and confidence-building.
Initiatives to create stronger military-to-military ties have, therefore, borne little fruit and
Washington is often uncertain how to interpret Chinese behaviour.
Military modernisation and expansion, and the strategic options that they are creating for Beijing,
are the most tangible characteristics of the challenge China represents for Washington. Chinese
policies are intended to increase the cost to Washington of maintaining its leadership in Asia. As
a US strategist has written, “China has been working systematically to undermine the American
approach to assurance, deterrence, and warfighting.” 227 The growth of China’s defence expenditure
that has enjoyed annual double-digit increases during the past 25 years—in 2014 alone it grew by
12.2 percent—has led to a vast increase in its military capabilities, in particular those of its navy
(see Table 5). 228 The speed with which the PLA(N) has developed a wide array of modern
platforms and capabilities, some rivalling those of the United States Navy (USN), as well as
infrastructure, have taken planners in Washington by surprise. 229 The acquisition within the
Chinese arsenal of increasingly sophisticated anti-access capabilities is especially worrying (see
Table 6). Elaborating on this, a former US Secretary of Defense stated in May 2010 that a
combination of lethal missiles and submarines “could end the operational sanctuary our Navy has
enjoyed in the Western Pacific for the better part of six decades.” 230 Raising the costs of US
power projection into Asian waters beyond what Washington views as tolerable, is at root the aim
of China’s current maritime strategy. Ideally from China’s perspective, it would overturn the
224 Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community, p. 19.
225 Andrew S. Erikson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Studying History to Guide China’s Rise as a Maritime Great
Power”, Harvard Asia Quarterly Vol. 12, Nos. 3-4, Winter 2010, p. 38.
226 See Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition
in the Asia-Pacific, and the Security Dilemma”, International Security Vol. 39, No. 2, Fall 2014, pp. 52–91.
227 Thomas G. Mahnken, Asia in the Balance: Transforming US Military Strategy in Asia, (American
Enterprise Institute: Washington, D.C., June 2012), p. 9 and United States, Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, D.C., March 2014), p. 6.
228 Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy?”, p. 66.
229 John Pomfret, “Defense Secretary Gates: U.S. Underestimated Parts of China’s Military Buildup”, The
Washington Post, 9 January 2011.
230 Michael Richardson, “Naval powers in Asia: Rise of Chinese navy changes the balance”, The Straits
Times, 10 May 2010.
48 DRDC-RDDC-2016-R085