The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

will be reduced. A study of the Libyan campaign prepared by the Royal United Services Institute
noted that the Royal Navy had to divert assets from other tasks to cope with operational demands;
but in doing so, there were significant opportunity costs and the relatively small operation that
Libya represented strained the deployed force. 438 The Royal Navy was able to absorb that strain,
if only just, due to the absence of any direct threat to the British Isles. That circumstance might
not always prevail. It stands to reason that increased demands for homeland defence will lead to a
reduction in the number of naval assets available for overseas operations.
In peace, as in war, there will also be implications. This is particularly so for those countries that use
their navies for outreach, either to conduct diplomacy or to reassure allies and partners. With fewer
ships, prioritization becomes more necessary and some regions will be favoured over others in terms
of where a naval presence is contemplated. This will impact the conduct of foreign policy and defence
relations, but it could also have broader strategic implications. As has already been noted, naval
presence is a form of signalling, and cutbacks in presence due to a smaller fleet might be interpreted
by an adversary in a manner that was never intended. The early-1982 decision to scrap HMS
Endurance, a victim of budget cuts, meant that the Falkland Islands were deprived of a Royal Navy
presence. As there was no vessel to replace it, Argentine media and officials saw the decision as a
deliberate gesture that Britain was no longer interested in the fate of its South Atlantic colony. 439
One argument frequently voiced in opposition to the need to maintain fleet size is that advanced
weapons and sensors reduce the number of naval platforms needed to achieve the same military
effect. This holds in certain instances, particularly those missions requiring only a single ship
deployment. The argument nonetheless overlooks missions where operational effectiveness
requires a multi-ship deployment. An incisive example of this is anti-submarine operations where
maritime air assets from more than one ship, often from ships distant to one another, are required
to effectively counter the submarine threat. 440 Advanced capabilities on fewer ships cannot alter
the fundamental requirements of the task. Indeed, the negative implications of breaking the iron
law that links utility of a naval force to numbers of platforms are already evident in the inability
of some navies to meet the demands of standing peacetime responsibilities. The Royal Navy is a
case in point. The impact of years of downsizing was revealed when it was admitted, at the time
of the Libyan operation in 2011 to which Britain had committed a naval force, that there was no
warship available to respond quickly to any potential threat that suddenly presented itself in
Britain’s home waters. 441 And, in late-2014, Britain had to call upon its NATO allies to assist in
locating a suspected Russian submarine off the coast of Scotland, due in part to the elimination of
438 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), “Conclusion”, Accidental Heroes; Britain, France and the
Libya Operation, London, September 2011, p. 13.
439 Sir Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1: The Origins of the
Falklands War (Routledge: London: 2005), pp. 125–126.
440 This argument is examined in detail in Maj. Bill Ansell, RCAF, Canadian Surface Combatant:
Helicopter Carrying Capacity (draft), 9 February 2015, pp. 28–36. I am grateful to the author for supplying
me with a copy of his unpublished draft.
441 “No warships left defending Britain after Defence cutbacks”, The Daily Telegraph, 1 November 2011.
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