The Future Maritime Operating Environment and the Role of Naval Power

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So far, China has been cautious in asserting its interests in the Arctic. Given the great distance involved in projecting power into the Arctic, caution is understandable. It is also politic, for while Beijing has attempted to build relations with several Arctic countries, notably Norway and Iceland (where the Chinese embassy will be the largest in that capital), suspicions surround its long-term intentions. 293 Russia is perhaps the most sensitive to Chinese ambitions. In early-2014, Russian officials identified China as a strategic competitor in Arctic development, and despite the closer relationship that Putin has fashioned with Beijing, the contending interests of the two Powers have not changed and will not easily be reconciled. 294 Like Russia, Canada’s interest in asserting its sovereign rights in the polar region could also be affected by China’s policy. While Beijing has not directly challenged Canadian Arctic claims, the ongoing debate in Chinese academic circles suggests that there is considerable opposition to Ottawa’s perspective. 295 Lastly, as climate change is opening the region to strategic competition, most countries’ armed forces will find operating there extremely daunting. The extreme cold and the difficulty of ensuring adequate supply will present unique challenges for personnel and equipment, and will require an expensive infrastructure, as Canada discovered when cost-estimates for its initial Arctic military presence were revealed. 296 For navies, expertise developed elsewhere will not be so easily applicable there. While the opening of the Arctic is likely to be accompanied by an increased focus on underwater capabilities and operations, the conduct of modern anti-submarine operations, that require a cooperative and coordinated mission involving sub-surface, surface and aerial platforms, will prove difficult to conduct there. As a report prepared for the USN noted, “[t]his extensive and deployable ASW infrastructure that supports the principal nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) hunter platforms is generally deployed in the temperate oceans, but it will be challenged to operate in the Arctic. As well, the supporting tactical oceanographic data collection, analysis, and distribution system does not extend to the Arctic.” Underwater acoustics will also be of a very different, often confusing, sort from what most submariners are accustomed to confronting. 297 The growing strategic importance of the Arctic is likely inevitable, but the ability of states to operate there effectively is uncertain. 293 A rumoured purchase of land on Spitsbergen Island, the largest island in the Svalbard Archipelago, by a Chinese businessman with connections to the Chinese Communist Party raised concerns about Beijing’s ambitions in the Arctic. See Andrew Higgins, “A Rare Arctic Land Sale Stokes Worry in Norway”, The New York Times, 27 September 2014. 294 Wright, The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World, p. 5. 295 Chinese commentators have suggested that discord over Canada’s claim to the NWP might be solved by using the 1920 Svalbard Treaty as a model. That treaty demilitarises the Svalbard archipelago, and grants “full and absolute sovereignty” to Norway. Nevertheless, it qualifies that declaration by guaranteeing “equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords, and ports” in Svalbard to all signatory states (42 to date). Article 3 of the treaty states: “The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality.” Interestingly, China used the 1920 agreement to establish its initial presence in the region in 2004 at the Arctic Yellow River Station in the Svalbard archipelago. See Wright, The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World, pp. 34–35. 296 See Steve Rennie, “Arctic naval base plans scaled back after costs soared: document”, CBC News (online), 8 September 2014 [accessed 12 November 2014 at www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/arctic-navalbase-plans-scaled-back-after-costs-soared-document-1.2759743]. 297 National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces, p. 107. 62 DRDC-RDDC-2016-R085
5 Mitigating the Challenges Maritime security is more than just about the sea. It embraces a range of maritime-related activities that pose risks and/or threats to states’ territorial security interests. 298 The responses are equally broad, and include both national and international approaches to the problem. Nationally, this is evident in recent decisions by governments to enhance their maritime domain awareness by dedicating increased resources for air-, sea-, and space-based platforms and sensors. 299 For countries with large ocean estates (e.g., Canada, Russia, the US, Australia, India and Indonesia) the challenge is monumental and will be a work in progress for many years, if not decades. It will demand vast resources and is beyond the ability of a single agency—a navy or a coast guard—to tackle successfully. Some strategy documents—Canada’s Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy (2011), the UK National Strategy for Maritime Security (2014), Washington’s Presidential Policy Directive 18: National Strategy for Maritime Security (2012) and National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan (2013), as well as the EU Maritime Security Strategy (2014)—explicitly acknowledge that maritime security requires a whole-of-government response. How governments will respond to their own national maritime security needs will be informed by strategic cultures, more immediate political assessments, and available resources. For some countries, particularly those traditionally sensitive about national security, a more narrow national approach, measured against the capability of other states, will be viewed as most appropriate. Russia’s maritime doctrine (2001) is a case in point. It is intended “to implement and protect the interests of the Russian Federation in the oceans and the strengthening of the position of the Russian Federation among the leading maritime nations.” 300 Where distrust of neighbours is widespread but resources are scant, individual countries’ maritime security needs will obviously not be met, even if ambitious objectives underscore a government’s priorities. For example, the “five pillars” of Indonesia’s maritime doctrine (November 2014) understandably reflect concerns about the safety of seaborne trade routes through the country’s waters as well as protection of its marine resources. 301 Alternatively, the Canada-US Beyond the Border Initiative (2011) builds upon a longstanding and relatively transparent bilateral defence relationship. In acknowledging that their security and economies are symbiotically connected, Washington and Ottawa have adopted a continental approach to maritime domain awareness, identifying creating a process to jointly address problem areas. 302 That decision reflects an even earlier determination to expand the mandate of the North American Aerospace Defence Command to include a maritime warning dimension. 298 Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, p. 4. 299 Maritime Domain Awareness can be defined as “having true and timely information about everything on, under, related to, adjacent to, or bordering a sea, ocean or other navigable waterway. This includes all related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, or other means of transport.” This definition is found at Transport Canada, Maritime Domain Awareness [accessed on 10 May 2015 at www.tc.gc.ca/eng/marinesecurity/initiatives-235.htm]. 300 President of the Russian Federation, Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020 (Moscow, 2001), p. 3. 301 Kessing’s Record of World Events, Vol. 609, No. 11, 2014, p. 53692. 302 Government of Canada, Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness (Ottawa, 2011), p. 5. DRDC-RDDC-2016-R085 63
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The Future Maritime Operating Envir
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Abstract … Drawing upon a wide ar
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Table of Contents Abstract … ....
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List of Figures Figure 1: One World
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Acknowledgements I am grateful to a
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1 Introduction 1 The maritime envir
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Much of the discussion that follows
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2 The Maritime Environment as a Glo
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finfish and shellfish are farmed. 3
Page 19 and 20:
2.2 Undersea Communications and Min
Page 21 and 22: esources) there will be continued g
Page 23 and 24: 2.4 Regulation of Ocean Space The U
Page 25 and 26: 3 Challenges to Order in the Mariti
Page 27 and 28: impossible, and certainly not a sho
Page 29 and 30: esult, confrontations between gover
Page 31 and 32: 3.2 Submarine Cables Given their si
Page 33 and 34: jurisdiction.” 99 There is, howev
Page 35 and 36: of al Qaeda had tried to buy into a
Page 37 and 38: 3.4.1 Chokepoints The existence of
Page 39 and 40: There is, moreover, a major securit
Page 41 and 42: In some regions, such as off the Ho
Page 43 and 44: will not be reduced by decisions of
Page 45 and 46: EEZ and protected it by using more
Page 47 and 48: access. 173 They will also alter th
Page 49 and 50: ecently noted, “[e]conomic growth
Page 51 and 52: evenue. Despite improvements in Sin
Page 53 and 54: Table 4: Overview of Major Indo-Pac
Page 55 and 56: 4.2 US Decline and Sino-US Competit
Page 57 and 58: joint statement regarding Beijing
Page 59 and 60: order upheld by the US since 1945 p
Page 61 and 62: population uncomfortable with a rev
Page 63 and 64: An important element of the 2012 st
Page 65 and 66: including the freedom of the seas.
Page 67 and 68: premiums for the NSR make the voyag
Page 69 and 70: activity in the Arctic could preced
Page 71: Alongside the impact of Russian pol
Page 75 and 76: Even in areas that directly intrude
Page 77 and 78: 6 The Role of Navies What is the ro
Page 79 and 80: The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is an
Page 81 and 82: More recently, a Chinese naval frig
Page 83 and 84: 6.4 Sea Control and Sea Denial 343
Page 85 and 86: quite possibly, the sea denial capa
Page 87 and 88: detection and counter-detection. It
Page 89 and 90: Whether they are conventional or nu
Page 91 and 92: theorists that confronting a modern
Page 93 and 94: The development of cyber capabiliti
Page 95 and 96: middle-Power navies will be unable
Page 97 and 98: those hostilities ended asserted th
Page 99 and 100: maritime patrol aircraft in controv
Page 101 and 102: traditional maritime Powers. For ri
Page 103 and 104: References .. Primary Sources Arcti
Page 105 and 106: _____, Congressional Budget Office.
Page 107 and 108: Clark, Bryan. The Emerging Era in U
Page 109 and 110: Krepinevich, Andrew. Why AirSea Bat
Page 111 and 112: Till, Geoffrey. Seapower - A Guide
Page 113 and 114: Burnett, Douglas R., Tara M. Davenp
Page 115 and 116: Grygiel, Jakub J.. “The Dilemmas
Page 117 and 118: Montgomery, Evan Braden. “Contest
Page 119 and 120: Weir, Gary E.. “The answer may be
Page 121 and 122: “Indian Navy Plans to Acquire 50
Page 123 and 124:
“Pew, National Geographic Applaud
Page 125 and 126:
DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA (Security mar
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