Transparency Initiative (EITI)

47
5.2.3 ANTI-CORRUPTION
es membership status when such data is being made available.
The report indicates that government and non-governmental
stakeholders use mining sector revenues for their
purposes such as forecasts, budget planning or advocacy
activities.
In contrast, Acosta emphasises that a “lack of stakeholder
leadership, the exclusion of key social actors, or pre-existing
institutional constraints such as weak accountability
and oversight institutions” or “the absence of sufficient
channels of communication” might endanger public debate
(Acosta 2013: 100). The Scanteam 2011 report also
points out, using the example of Nigeria, that just the provision
of information is not sufficient for public discourse
(p.24). While media and civil society organizations might
forward key messages to the public, particularly CSOs appear
to miss a viable strategy “for holding the public sector
accountable for the use of the revenues”.
Another obstacle for public debate, reported from Azerbaijan,
is the lack of interest of the population in the information
offered by the EITI as it does not recognize the “direct
and positive links between the EITI and the living standards”,
which makes it difficult to engage people in discussions
or motivate them to disseminate information even on
a local level (Wilson 2014: 26, referring to Ahmadov/Wilson
2012). It can be noticed that in recent years the crack-down
on civil society in the very case of Azerbaijan and an overall
global shrinking of civic space in autocratic regimes and
deficient democracies has led to the introduction of the
EITI Civil Society Protocol in 2015, in order to safeguard
NGOs and civil society participation in the EITI.
NON-SPECIFICALLY ON THE EITI:
In contexts, where freedom of expression and assembly is
restricted, it may be even harder to engage the general public.
Mildner/Lauster (2011: 100) refer to Shaxon (2009), who
points out that “direct pressure can be counter-productive
and rejected” particularly under politically fragile and autocratic
framework conditions such as in Angola (which is
not an EITI implementing country).
``
Limited evidence to which extent the EITI contributes
to anti-corruption and improved public financial management.
A number of anecdotal references and hints
are offered.
COVERING THE STANDARD 2013:
The only study, which concretely focuses on the connection
between transparency and corruption and provides
evidence on that issue, is the one from Etter (2014), which
is based on two in-depth case studies in Peru and Mali. The
study indicates “a robust reduction of corruption in Peru,
where corruption has been reduced by as much as 14 percentage
points [perceived as a business obstacle by surveyed
companies] since the introduction of the EITI, while
no such effect [was] found in Mali.” Thereby, Etter ascribes
this controversial finding to the differences of the countries’
civil societies, whose functionality is regarded as an
essential prerequisite for the effectiveness of the initiative
in that regard.
Bickham (2015), based on recent empirical findings from
interviews and surveys with the industry, MSGs, implementing
and supporting governments and further stakeholders,
provides a rather scattered picture. In conclusion
(p. 29ff), there is still room for improving the effectiveness
of the initiative regarding its contribution to better public
financial management, e.g. by intensified involvement
of the industry or strengthening public administration capacities.
Neumann (2014: 9) summarizes literature and documents
on the basis of three country case studies from Nigeria, DRC
and Sierra Leone. He finds that the EITI appears to be related
to increasing governmental revenues through revealing
discrepancies of tax payments. He however also states that
the data does not allow conclusions about the contribution
of the EITI to the developments in these countries, as they
might be confounded or even vice-versa related.
Furthermore, at least anecdotal references can be found in
the EITI progress reports, which contain a number of examples
that EITI reports have revealed cases of fraud and
corruption as for instance in Nigeria (EITI 2014: 25; 2013:
25, 32), Liberia (EITI 2014: 27; 2011: 14) or the DRC (2014:
21).
BEFORE THE STANDARD 2013:
Using the example of Nigeria, the Scanteam 2011 (p. 12)
report also rates the “lack of a systemic link between NEITI
activities and approaches to larger PFM [Public Finance