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OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report

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to the size of the resources available to each CCP (see Figure 50). That ranges<br />

from 0.8 percent to 5.8 percent of prepaid and callable default resources.<br />

Initial margin resources. Margin requirements are set by the CCP’s modeled<br />

estimates of potential losses on a member’s derivatives portfolio. The<br />

requirements apply to clearing members’ own house accounts and to those<br />

of their customers. Clearing members are responsible for meeting the minimum<br />

collateral requirement on behalf of their customers.<br />

The proportion of total collateral that clearing members post for their<br />

customers varies among U.S. CCPs, according to the new data. The split<br />

between customer and house collateral should reflect their positions and<br />

risk exposures. Figure 49 shows that customer margin accounts are relatively<br />

large for traditional futures and options markets, such as Options Clearing<br />

Corp. and CME. Options Clearing Corp.’s customer accounts were 88 percent<br />

of total required initial margin. CME’s were 82 percent. Customer<br />

margin accounts are relatively small for markets for interest rate swaps and<br />

credit default swaps: 50 percent of total margin at ICE Clear Credit and less<br />

than 39 percent at SwapClear.<br />

The disclosure also reports the number of times that a CCP’s margin<br />

requirement failed to cover changes in the mark-to-market value of an<br />

account. Such shortfalls create an intraday or end-of-day exposure for the<br />

CCP to the clearing member. Of the four CCPs in Figure 49, three reported<br />

shortfalls in their disclosures for the second quarter of <strong>2016</strong>. CME reported<br />

that shortfalls had occurred 10 times, LCH 521 times, and OCC 39 times.<br />

None reported a shortfall in 2015.<br />

Liquidity resources. Derivatives CCPs’ major liquidity risk results from the<br />

nature of their payment flows. Clearing members are required to make variation<br />

margin payments to the CCPs to cover the effects of price changes to<br />

their customers’ and their own positions.<br />

The new quarterly disclosure data show the amounts of liquid assets,<br />

defined as either cash or Treasury securities, held by each CCP as margin<br />

and guarantee funds. The data show the average and peak variation margin<br />

payments required by a CCP during the previous quarter. They also show<br />

the impact from the hypothetical failure of the CCP’s one or two largest<br />

clearing members. In addition, they report any daily losses exceeding<br />

existing margin accounts.<br />

<strong>OFR</strong> analysis of the U.S. CCPs’ filings shows they hold the majority<br />

of margin and guarantee funds in liquid assets. For example, CCPs’ initial<br />

margin funds range from 83 percent to 99 percent invested in liquid<br />

assets. The one exception is Options Clearing Corp., which allows referenced<br />

securities, such as the underlying stock in a covered call transaction,<br />

as collateral when writing such options.<br />

Key Threats to <strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> 53

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