OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report
OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report
OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report
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to the size of the resources available to each CCP (see Figure 50). That ranges<br />
from 0.8 percent to 5.8 percent of prepaid and callable default resources.<br />
Initial margin resources. Margin requirements are set by the CCP’s modeled<br />
estimates of potential losses on a member’s derivatives portfolio. The<br />
requirements apply to clearing members’ own house accounts and to those<br />
of their customers. Clearing members are responsible for meeting the minimum<br />
collateral requirement on behalf of their customers.<br />
The proportion of total collateral that clearing members post for their<br />
customers varies among U.S. CCPs, according to the new data. The split<br />
between customer and house collateral should reflect their positions and<br />
risk exposures. Figure 49 shows that customer margin accounts are relatively<br />
large for traditional futures and options markets, such as Options Clearing<br />
Corp. and CME. Options Clearing Corp.’s customer accounts were 88 percent<br />
of total required initial margin. CME’s were 82 percent. Customer<br />
margin accounts are relatively small for markets for interest rate swaps and<br />
credit default swaps: 50 percent of total margin at ICE Clear Credit and less<br />
than 39 percent at SwapClear.<br />
The disclosure also reports the number of times that a CCP’s margin<br />
requirement failed to cover changes in the mark-to-market value of an<br />
account. Such shortfalls create an intraday or end-of-day exposure for the<br />
CCP to the clearing member. Of the four CCPs in Figure 49, three reported<br />
shortfalls in their disclosures for the second quarter of <strong>2016</strong>. CME reported<br />
that shortfalls had occurred 10 times, LCH 521 times, and OCC 39 times.<br />
None reported a shortfall in 2015.<br />
Liquidity resources. Derivatives CCPs’ major liquidity risk results from the<br />
nature of their payment flows. Clearing members are required to make variation<br />
margin payments to the CCPs to cover the effects of price changes to<br />
their customers’ and their own positions.<br />
The new quarterly disclosure data show the amounts of liquid assets,<br />
defined as either cash or Treasury securities, held by each CCP as margin<br />
and guarantee funds. The data show the average and peak variation margin<br />
payments required by a CCP during the previous quarter. They also show<br />
the impact from the hypothetical failure of the CCP’s one or two largest<br />
clearing members. In addition, they report any daily losses exceeding<br />
existing margin accounts.<br />
<strong>OFR</strong> analysis of the U.S. CCPs’ filings shows they hold the majority<br />
of margin and guarantee funds in liquid assets. For example, CCPs’ initial<br />
margin funds range from 83 percent to 99 percent invested in liquid<br />
assets. The one exception is Options Clearing Corp., which allows referenced<br />
securities, such as the underlying stock in a covered call transaction,<br />
as collateral when writing such options.<br />
Key Threats to <strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> 53