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OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report

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Figure 55. Life Insurance Securities Lending Activity<br />

($ billions) and Insurer Participation (number of<br />

insurers)<br />

More insurers are participating in securities lending<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

Insurers engaged in securities lending (left axis)<br />

Securities lending activity (right axis)<br />

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015<br />

Sources: SNL <strong>Financial</strong> LC, <strong>OFR</strong> analysis<br />

Figure 56. SRISK Capital Shortfall ($ billions)<br />

The median U.S. G-SII SRISK measure is above that of the<br />

median U.S. G-SIB<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

Median U.S. G-SIB<br />

Median U.S. G-SII<br />

0<br />

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 <strong>2016</strong><br />

Note: SRISK is a widely cited measure of a financial firm’s contribution<br />

to systemic risk, and is an estimate of the capital a firm<br />

would need in a severe market decline. G-SII stands for global<br />

systemically important insurer. G-SIB stands for global systemically<br />

important bank.<br />

Sources: The Volatility Laboratory of the NYU Stern Volatility Institute<br />

(https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu), <strong>OFR</strong> analysis<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

and Zhu, 2011). These include conditional Value-at-<br />

Risk (CoVaR), distress insurance premium (DIP), and<br />

SRISK (see Systemic Risk Metrics). All three rely on<br />

publicly available market and financial data, including<br />

the market value of equity; book value of equity, assets,<br />

and liabilities; and control variables.<br />

Using these metrics, the contribution to systemic<br />

risk from U.S. global systemically important insurers<br />

(G-SIIs) appears to be rising. In some cases, it may be<br />

higher than for some U.S. global systemically important<br />

banks (G-SIBs) (see Kaserer and Klein, <strong>2016</strong>). Figure<br />

56 shows the SRISK capital shortfall measure for<br />

the median U.S. G-SIB and median U.S. G-SII. For<br />

example, the contribution to systemic risk of the median<br />

U.S. G-SII based on the SRISK measure has steadily<br />

increased during the past decade. As of March <strong>2016</strong>, it<br />

stood above that of the median U.S. G-SIB pre-crisis.<br />

Figure 57 compares several large U.S. insurers to<br />

six of the U.S. G-SIBs. As of June <strong>2016</strong>, two of the<br />

insurers, Prudential and MetLife, were among the top<br />

five riskiest firms according to SRISK and the top six<br />

according to DIP. These insurers rank above Goldman<br />

Sachs and Morgan Stanley based on SRISK. They rank<br />

roughly equal to those investment banks based on DIP.<br />

These market-based measures of systemic risk, combined<br />

with other factors, suggest the need for vigilance<br />

in monitoring the risks of some large U.S. insurers (see<br />

Drivers of Insurers’ Systemic Risk Indicators).<br />

Regulatory Policies Improving<br />

Regulators have taken several policy steps to address the<br />

risks posed by insurance companies since the financial<br />

crisis. These actions include new requirements for firms<br />

that are nonbank financial companies designated by<br />

the <strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> Oversight Council, the Federal<br />

Reserve’s proposed capital standards for insurers under<br />

its supervision, and a requirement that insurers provide<br />

state regulators with a risk and solvency assessment.<br />

In June <strong>2016</strong>, the Federal Reserve proposed enhanced<br />

prudential standards for designated insurers related to<br />

liquidity and risk management. It also proposed capital<br />

64 <strong>2016</strong> | <strong>OFR</strong> <strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> <strong>Report</strong>

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