OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report
OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report
OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
One measure of a CCP’s liquidity adequacy is the ratio of total liquid<br />
margin to the average daily variation margin payments. The data show that<br />
the amount of liquidity far exceeds average daily needs. The ratio varies<br />
among U.S. CCPs from 35 to 101 times. A stricter measure is the ratio of<br />
total liquid margin to the peak variation margin payment in the previous 12<br />
months. That ratio ranges from 14 to 28 among U.S. CCPs. (OCC did not<br />
report the peak amount of variation margin payments.)<br />
Counterparty concentration. CCPs face the risk that their outstanding<br />
exposures become concentrated in one or a few large counterparties. This<br />
concentration would pose potential systemic risks, in the event of default of<br />
a large clearing member, because mutualized losses on these exposures are<br />
transmitted elsewhere in the financial system and because the unwinding of<br />
large, concentrated positions aggravates market volatility.<br />
The disclosure data provide new but limited information about the<br />
degree of concentration in CCPs. Figure 50 shows that the largest five<br />
clearing members accounted for roughly half of outstanding exposures at<br />
most clearing services. That ratio was 27 percent for SwapClear, whose members<br />
are mainly dealers in the interest rate swap market. The figures show<br />
aggregate margin amounts for the five largest firms on an average daily and<br />
peak day basis. The peak amounts differ little from those of the average. This<br />
implies that the largest five firms do not change position sizes much or that<br />
they do not change them much more than others in the market. The absence<br />
of a large difference between these figures mitigates concerns about the<br />
potential for concentration risk to intensify when markets become volatile.<br />
Data shortcomings. Some problems with the data are typical of new<br />
reporting standards. The CCPs left many elements blank. Inconsistent<br />
responses among CCPs show that some fields are still open to interpretation.<br />
This ambiguity limits comparisons among CCPs. For example, CCPs<br />
inconsistently reported the average daily volume and average daily outstanding<br />
amounts of cleared transactions. CCPs’ reported total figures are<br />
not always consistent with other data sources that measure market activity.<br />
Also, not all reported items refer to the same range or point in time, making<br />
it difficult to answer key questions. For example, CCPs must report the<br />
largest estimated stressed losses from the previous 12 months, but they<br />
report available default resources only at the end of each quarter.<br />
These incomplete and inconsistent disclosures may reflect the failure<br />
to use a common readable file template. They may also reflect differences<br />
in interpretation that result in inconsistencies in the choice of reporting<br />
forms, field identifiers, levels of aggregation, interpretation of definitions, or<br />
completeness of reporting figures. In some cases, disclosures refer to external<br />
documents that may be hard to locate. Some of these inconsistencies may<br />
Key Threats to <strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> 55