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XV-15 litho - NASA's History Office

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16<br />

Research and Engineering), obtained support from C. W. (Bill) Harper, Chief of<br />

the Aeronautics Division in the <strong>Office</strong> of Advanced Research and Technology<br />

(OART) at NASA Headquarters, for another entry in the Ames 40- by 80-foot<br />

wind tunnel. This test involved configuration variations that were predicted to<br />

alter the rotor/pylon/wing aeroelastic stability. The test results were compared<br />

with the pre-test predictions to determine if the evolving analytical methodology<br />

adequately represented the aircraft’s structural dynamics. Without a speed capability<br />

well in excess of the helicopter’s maximum speed, the tilt rotor aircraft did<br />

not fulfill the performance requirements of the VTOL mission. Lacking a valid<br />

structural stability prediction method, the design of a new tilt rotor aircraft was<br />

considered to have a high level of uncertainty and therefore an unacceptable<br />

high-risk undertaking.<br />

The planned test could have exposed the <strong>XV</strong>-3 aircraft, as well as the 40- by 80foot<br />

wind tunnel, to possible damage due to the potential for an explosively rapid<br />

failure caused by instability. Could Ames accept this unusual risk? Showing great<br />

confidence in the technical approach, the decision to accept the test was made by<br />

Mark Kelly, NASA’s Chief of the Large Scale Aerodynamics Branch, and<br />

Woodrow L. (Woody) Cook, Chief of the Advanced Aircraft Programs <strong>Office</strong>.<br />

The Bell test team was led by Kipling (Kip) Edenborough, who served as test<br />

director, and included Claude Leibensberger, Flight Test Engineer for the <strong>XV</strong>-3<br />

project. The test, which ran from October to November 1968, proceeded remarkably<br />

well for all of the planned test conditions. The level of damping (i.e. stability)<br />

was assessed by disturbing the pylon and measuring the resulting vibrations.<br />

Decaying vibration amplitudes indicated a stable structure, constant amplitude<br />

vibrations indicated neutral stability, and growing amplitudes revealed a dangerous<br />

unstable condition. Test results showed that configurations predicted to be<br />

stable were in fact stable, and those predicted to be unstable showed signs of<br />

decreasing stability as the stability limit speed was approached. With the aircraft<br />

in its most stable condition, a run at maximum wind tunnel speed, recognized as<br />

a high risk condition, completed the test activity. When the wind tunnel was<br />

taken to its maximum airspeed capability (of nearly 200 knots), the vibratory<br />

loads data once again verified the predicted stability.<br />

Disaster Strikes<br />

Suddenly both pylons separated from the wing and were blown down the tunnel.<br />

The <strong>XV</strong>-3 was extensively damaged in what appeared to be the result of the<br />

inability to design an aeroelastically stable tilt rotor aircraft. However, after<br />

months of careful examination of the damaged structure and analyses of the incident,<br />

the test data revealed this was not the case. The failure was traced to a<br />

fatigue crack and rivets working loose in the left wingtip spar. The progressing<br />

crack and loose rivets reduced the stiffness of the pylon attachment to the level<br />

where a resonance occurred, producing the high oscillatory loads that led to the<br />

subsequent massive structural failure. The right rotor, exposed to extremely high

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