XV-15 litho - NASA's History Office
XV-15 litho - NASA's History Office
XV-15 litho - NASA's History Office
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16<br />
Research and Engineering), obtained support from C. W. (Bill) Harper, Chief of<br />
the Aeronautics Division in the <strong>Office</strong> of Advanced Research and Technology<br />
(OART) at NASA Headquarters, for another entry in the Ames 40- by 80-foot<br />
wind tunnel. This test involved configuration variations that were predicted to<br />
alter the rotor/pylon/wing aeroelastic stability. The test results were compared<br />
with the pre-test predictions to determine if the evolving analytical methodology<br />
adequately represented the aircraft’s structural dynamics. Without a speed capability<br />
well in excess of the helicopter’s maximum speed, the tilt rotor aircraft did<br />
not fulfill the performance requirements of the VTOL mission. Lacking a valid<br />
structural stability prediction method, the design of a new tilt rotor aircraft was<br />
considered to have a high level of uncertainty and therefore an unacceptable<br />
high-risk undertaking.<br />
The planned test could have exposed the <strong>XV</strong>-3 aircraft, as well as the 40- by 80foot<br />
wind tunnel, to possible damage due to the potential for an explosively rapid<br />
failure caused by instability. Could Ames accept this unusual risk? Showing great<br />
confidence in the technical approach, the decision to accept the test was made by<br />
Mark Kelly, NASA’s Chief of the Large Scale Aerodynamics Branch, and<br />
Woodrow L. (Woody) Cook, Chief of the Advanced Aircraft Programs <strong>Office</strong>.<br />
The Bell test team was led by Kipling (Kip) Edenborough, who served as test<br />
director, and included Claude Leibensberger, Flight Test Engineer for the <strong>XV</strong>-3<br />
project. The test, which ran from October to November 1968, proceeded remarkably<br />
well for all of the planned test conditions. The level of damping (i.e. stability)<br />
was assessed by disturbing the pylon and measuring the resulting vibrations.<br />
Decaying vibration amplitudes indicated a stable structure, constant amplitude<br />
vibrations indicated neutral stability, and growing amplitudes revealed a dangerous<br />
unstable condition. Test results showed that configurations predicted to be<br />
stable were in fact stable, and those predicted to be unstable showed signs of<br />
decreasing stability as the stability limit speed was approached. With the aircraft<br />
in its most stable condition, a run at maximum wind tunnel speed, recognized as<br />
a high risk condition, completed the test activity. When the wind tunnel was<br />
taken to its maximum airspeed capability (of nearly 200 knots), the vibratory<br />
loads data once again verified the predicted stability.<br />
Disaster Strikes<br />
Suddenly both pylons separated from the wing and were blown down the tunnel.<br />
The <strong>XV</strong>-3 was extensively damaged in what appeared to be the result of the<br />
inability to design an aeroelastically stable tilt rotor aircraft. However, after<br />
months of careful examination of the damaged structure and analyses of the incident,<br />
the test data revealed this was not the case. The failure was traced to a<br />
fatigue crack and rivets working loose in the left wingtip spar. The progressing<br />
crack and loose rivets reduced the stiffness of the pylon attachment to the level<br />
where a resonance occurred, producing the high oscillatory loads that led to the<br />
subsequent massive structural failure. The right rotor, exposed to extremely high