Securities Activities of Banks in the GLB Era - Cleary Gottlieb Steen ...
Securities Activities of Banks in the GLB Era - Cleary Gottlieb Steen ...
Securities Activities of Banks in the GLB Era - Cleary Gottlieb Steen ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
(i) Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> access <strong>of</strong> senior legal and compliance<br />
personnel is regular and systematic, or ad hoc and<br />
episodic.<br />
(ii) Even if access is regular, whe<strong>the</strong>r it <strong>in</strong>volves a full<br />
analysis <strong>of</strong> compliance developments and exposures,<br />
or is cursory.<br />
(iii) Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> firm’s commitment to provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />
technology resources is as great for compliance as it is<br />
for o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>itiatives.<br />
(iv) Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> firm has analyzed compliance technology<br />
proposals that did not receive approval <strong>in</strong> prior budgets<br />
to see if exposures are still <strong>the</strong>re.<br />
(v) Whe<strong>the</strong>r areas such as fixed <strong>in</strong>come, stock loan and<br />
operations have received <strong>the</strong> same level <strong>of</strong> compliance<br />
attention as equity and <strong>in</strong>vestment bank<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
(vi) Whe<strong>the</strong>r employees are truly rewarded for rais<strong>in</strong>g what<br />
<strong>the</strong>y perceive as compliance issues. 50<br />
d. With respect to <strong>in</strong>vestment advisers/<strong>in</strong>vestment companies:<br />
50 See also NYSE Information Memos No. 05-77 (October 7, 2005) (factors considered<br />
by <strong>the</strong> NYSE Division <strong>of</strong> Enforcement <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sanctions for violations <strong>of</strong><br />
statutes, regulations or rules; heightened penalties could arise as a result <strong>of</strong> failure to<br />
implement corrective measures, neglect or disregard <strong>of</strong> “red flags” and <strong>in</strong>effective<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g or education programs), No. 05-65 (September 14, 2005) (guidance on<br />
obligations to cooperate with NYSE reviews, exam<strong>in</strong>ations and <strong>in</strong>vestigations, and to<br />
provide disclosure to <strong>the</strong> NYSE <strong>of</strong> violations <strong>of</strong> NYSE rules or federal securities<br />
laws; discussion <strong>of</strong> “exceptional or extraord<strong>in</strong>ary cooperation” that has <strong>the</strong> potential<br />
to <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>the</strong> NYSE to seek a reduced sanction, to decide to br<strong>in</strong>g reduced or less<br />
serious charges, to obviate <strong>the</strong> need for an undertak<strong>in</strong>g, or to decide to forgo br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g<br />
charges altoge<strong>the</strong>r); Wall Street Letter, December 19, 2005 (NYSE focus on physical<br />
separation between proprietary trad<strong>in</strong>g and stock trad<strong>in</strong>g desks).<br />
65