BoundedRationality_TheAdaptiveToolbox.pdf

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Kevin A. McCabe and Vernon L. Smith
will find much higher (often-sustainable) contributions to the public good, and
that this will occur even though the subjects themselves are not informed as to
the nature of the assignment rule. The data support this hypothesis. The four
highest contributors experience high group contributions and find it natural to
reciprocate; the four lowest contributors observe others behaving like themselves
and free riding is more frequent.
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