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Florin Nicolae ARDELEAN
War experience in the early modern period was radically changed in comparison
with the previous centuries. Heavy cavalry charges, individual value and heroism of
the medieval warriors were replaced by ranged confrontations due to the use of a
large variety of fire arms (both artillery and smaller individual weapons) and also by
the capacity of commanders to maneuver large masses of soldiers 2 . The outcome of
battles was greatly influenced by the capacity of officers to follow the battle plan and
by the capacity of common soldiers to follow the orders of their superiors and
perform the required maneuvers. Keeping the battle formations was also essential.
The temptation to run in front of a superior enemy or to pursue in disorder an inferior
one, attracted by plunder possibilities, could result in heavy losses for any army 3 .
General Montecuccoli advised any commander to destroy roads and bridges behind
his own army in order to discourage deserters and not to hesitate in killing all soldiers
that turned their backs on the enemy 4 .
The morale of the troops was most often maintained by regular payment and the
right to war plunders, as war was being perceived by common soldiers as a way of
making a living and, for some lucky few, a way of getting rich. The cohesion of
military units also depended on the bounds of comradeship that developed over a long
time of common experience and service or, by bounds of common origin, in the case
of units recruited from the same region 5 .
The soldiers of the early modern period had to face many difficulties and
adversities, but the most frequent and devastating were hunger and epidemics. Many
historians agreed on the fact that more soldiers were victims of diseases and lack of
2
Frank Tallett, War and Society in Early Modern Europe 1495-1715, London and New York, 1992, p.
42.
3
An eloquent illustration of such a situation is given by the battle of Mezőkeresztes from 1596, where a
Transylvanian army lead by Prince Sigismund Báthory fought alongside the Habsburg army that was
facing a significant Turkish force lead by the sultan himself. Most contemporary descriptions of this
important battle of the Long War (1593-1606) consider the greed of Christian soldiers, which entered
the Turkish camp in disorder, attracted by the perspective of rich loot, the main cause of their defeat.
Memorialul lui Nagy Szabó Ferencz din Târgu Mureş (1580-1658),Bucureşti, 1993, p. 81-83; András
Komáromy, A Mezőkeresztesi csata 1596-ban, in „Hadtörténelmi Közlemények”, vol. V, Budapest,
1892, p. 281-284; Aurel Decei, Istoria Imperiului otoman, Bucureşti, 1978, p. 282.
4
Frank Tallett, op.cit., p. 48.
5
The recruitment of soldiers, both local and foreign mercenaries, based on their common origin was a
respected rule by most European states. The efficiency of the Swiss soldiers was due to their national
and regional solidarity. The Swiss mercenaries were organized in companies (Haufen) of 200 men, lead
by a captain designated by the authorities of the region from where the soldiers originated from. The
members of each company had the right to elect some of their officers. Christer Jörgensen, Michael F.
Pavkovici, Rob S. Rice, Fighting Techniques of the Early Modern World. AD 1500 ~ AD 1763.
Equipment, Combat Skils, and Tactics, New York, 2005, p. 8; the custom of territorial recruiting was
also maintained in the Transylvanian armies, where the different military structures that formed the
army of the principality were organized according to the origin of the soldiers. The infantry
detachments (usually bearing fire arms) sent by Saxon towns, the cavalry of the Székely and the units
of the county nobility fought under their own banners. Furthermore the noble cavalry and the militias
recruited from the estates of the nobility were organized in units representing their county of origin.
Florin Ardelean, Obligațiile militare ale nobilimii în Transilvania princiară (1540-1657), in “Crisia”,
XL, 2010, p. 193-209.