Review of anti-corruption strategies Rob McCusker - Australian ...

Basic approaches to anti-corruption
In designing an anti-corruption strategy it is imperative to be cognisant of the fundamental characteristics
and nature of corruption itself. Essentially, it must be recognised and appreciated that theories of
corruption causation have to be interpreted in the context of actual and/or likely human behaviour,
drivers and interaction. It should also be noted that some commentators have suggested that economic
progress may in fact be dependent upon, rather than impeded by corrupt practices. A useful analogy
for understanding the impact of, and solutions to, corruption is to compare its nature with that of a
pandemic. Above all, a determination to consider corruption as an issue best mitigated by a holistic as
opposed to a sectoral approach is integral to a well designed anti-corruption strategy. These issues are
dealt with in more detail below.
There are (at least) three key schools of thought on corruption reduction and prevention. First,
interventionism, in which the relevant authorities wait for the corrupt action to occur and then intervene
to capture and punish the offender. This school stimulates retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence but
there remain a number of obstructive variables including:
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the harm has already occurred and cannot be undone
the majority of crimes remain unreported
the demand on finite resources will inevitably be infinite given the degree of supervision necessary to
ensure that the deterrence effect operates.
If the dark figure of crime prevents most crimes being detected, reported and responded to, what
reasonable measure of deterrence can pertain?
Second, managerialism, in which those individuals or agencies seeking to engage in corrupt behaviour
can be discouraged or prevented from doing so by establishing appropriate systems, procedures and
protocols. In essence, managerialism advocates the reduction or elimination of opportunities such that
those who generally benefit from them cease to be able to do so. There are limitations with this school of
thought also, key amongst which are the fact that individuals do not necessarily operate according to the
predetermined principles of managerialism. Organisations contain three broad categories of people who
will react differently to corrupt influences:
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category I: people who want to do the right thing and require guidance on how to achieve this
category II: people who are too timid to take the risk of operating outside set rules
category III: people who are corrupt and will operate outside of the rules entirely.
A rule may exist which restricts the amount of money an official can receive as a gift to $50. People in
category I know this rule exists and simply obey it. People in category III will simply not declare the gift
and thus flout the rule. People in category II who wish to receive a bribe of $100 simply register two gifts
of $50 each. The letter, but not the spirit, of the rule has been adhered to and yet clearly such people
have engaged in corruption.
All rules can be subverted. Managerialism attempts to provide one set of rules to deter a number of
differently motivated individuals. The consequences of this approach are that the success of the anticorruption
effort is fragmented, intercepting the less scheming corruptee but not the more damaging
highly planned exploits of others. Equally, managerialist control of corruption ignores market forces. If,
for example, public officials are approached to provide confidential information in exchange for money,
some may deem the risk too great and refuse. Those who are willing to engage in the activity however,
will be able to raise the price of that information which will increase the attractiveness of corruption and
sustain its existence.