iv Acknowledgment The author thanks Karen Collier and Janine Chandler <strong>of</strong> the JV Barry Library at the AIC, for their invaluable assistance in sourcing material for this report and in particular for producing the <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> bibliography. Dr Judy Putt, Research Manager at the AIC is also thanked for her comments on earlier drafts <strong>of</strong> the report.
Executive summary The <strong>Australian</strong> Institute <strong>of</strong> Criminology (AIC) was asked to review the literature concerning <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> <strong>strategies</strong>, and particularly to identify the common elements deemed to underpin and/or undermine their effectiveness. A bibliography covering the period from 2000 to 2006 was compiled as part <strong>of</strong> this report and endeavoured to provide details <strong>of</strong> indicative sources on the context and operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> programs. The bibliography was not intended to be a comprehensive review <strong>of</strong> <strong>corruption</strong> literature per se but rather to provide a specific overview <strong>of</strong> sources which contained details and analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>anti</strong><strong>corruption</strong> <strong>strategies</strong>. It also sought to examine those sources which concerned themselves largely with the Asia–Pacific region. From the 231 sources located in the initial literature search, a subset which emphasised practical rather than purely theoretical approaches taken, was evaluated. Corruption continues to manifest itself in a number <strong>of</strong> ways. It ranges from petty to grand in nature, from political to bureaucratic in focus and from incidental to systemic in scope. Emanating essentially from the exploitation <strong>of</strong> public <strong>of</strong>fice for private gain, <strong>corruption</strong> radiates from governments through agencies and impacts upon the individuals and/or organisations required to liaise with those agencies in order to obtain basic services. Given the range and impact <strong>of</strong> corrupt behaviour, any <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> strategy must be cognisant <strong>of</strong> the causes <strong>of</strong> <strong>corruption</strong>, the political and socio-economic environment in which <strong>corruption</strong> thrives and the broader links between <strong>corruption</strong>, organised crime and international illicit capital flows. A key factor underpinning <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> efforts is the requirement for a holistic approach to be taken. This is best epitomised by the National Integrity System (NIS) proposed by Transparency International (2001), comprising a set <strong>of</strong> objectives, supported by key <strong>strategies</strong> and delivered through institutions, sectors or specific activities known as pillars. The NIS is not dependent upon each pillar functioning or functioning in unison with other pillars. Indeed, the NIS structure permits weakness in one pillar to be mitigated by strength in another. Although perhaps self-evident, it is important to recognise that the errant behaviour <strong>of</strong> individuals lies at the heart <strong>of</strong> <strong>corruption</strong>. Any successful <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> strategy therefore should endeavour to understand the <strong>of</strong>ten complex interactions that exist between the initiator <strong>of</strong> the corrupt act, the person who passively or actively participates in <strong>corruption</strong> and the wider society which meets the costs, directly or indirectly, <strong>of</strong> that <strong>corruption</strong>. Issues to be decided in the first instance include a determination <strong>of</strong> the focus <strong>of</strong> the strategy, for example, upon the <strong>of</strong>fice or the <strong>of</strong>fice holder, whether efforts should protect state revenues (through enhancing agency integrity) or seek to prosecute those abusing such revenues and whether a cost benefit analysis <strong>of</strong> vulnerable departments can assist in determining the prioritisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> efforts. In terms <strong>of</strong> the design <strong>of</strong> <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> <strong>strategies</strong> it is important to construct a set <strong>of</strong> incentives to encourage rule-abiding, and discourage rule-averse, behaviour by individuals engaged in corrupt practices. Thus, for example, <strong>strategies</strong> which reduce the scope for <strong>corruption</strong> via policy changes, increase the costs <strong>of</strong> <strong>corruption</strong> via monitoring and punishment <strong>of</strong> errant behaviour and induce selfrestraint within government are important first principles. It is clear from the literature that attempting to provide and implement a one size fits all <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> strategy is unlikely to be successful. Even where the strategy comprises a number <strong>of</strong> discrete parts, which are designed to be implemented in an incremental fashion, it is imperative that an assessment <strong>of</strong> the logic and potential adverse consequences <strong>of</strong> the implementation sequence is made. Thus, for example, establishing an <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> agency without ensuring that an honest judiciary is also present may undermine the efforts <strong>of</strong> the former. Similarly, if police <strong>corruption</strong> remains rife and the judiciary honest, the former will prevent cases <strong>of</strong> interest coming before the courts and thus negate the impact <strong>of</strong> the judiciary.
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