Review of anti-corruption strategies Rob McCusker - Australian ...

to measurement and analysis of misgovernance when the rules of the game have been captured by the
elite through undue influence. The paper constructs a new set of ethics indices, encompassing forms of
(legal) corruption not subject to measurement in conventional (illegal) corruption indicators. It is found that
manifestations of legal corruption may be more prevalent than illegal forms, such as outright bribery, and
particularly so in richer countries. Further, the paper finds that governance constraints, and corruption in
particular, is a key determinant of a country’s global competitiveness. These findings challenge traditional
notions of what constitutes the country’s investment climate, and who shapes it. It is also found that
illegal forms of corruption continue to be prevalent in the interaction between transnationals of the rich
world and the public sectors in many emerging countries. Finally, the paper suggests an empirical link
between governance and security issues.
Kumar CR 2004. Human rights approaches of corruption control mechanisms – enhancing the Hong
Kong experience of corruption prevention strategies. San Diego international law journal 5: 323
This paper considers corruption in Hong Kong and includes analysis of the nature and impact of the
Independent Commission Against Corruption, the role of the media and civil society in combating
corruption and the relationship between corruption and human rights.
Lindsey T 2004. Legal infrastructure and governance reform in post-crisis Asia: the case of Indonesia.
Asian–Pacific economic literature 18: 12–40
This paper reflects on problems encountered in implementing legal infrastructure reform in the light of
current theory and recent, post-crisis experience in East Asia. Indonesia’s experience of radical legal
infrastructure reform in the six years since the crisis began has been both extensive and troubled. It
is therefore a compelling case study of whether the new paradigm of Post-Washington Consensus
Governance reform has delivered the kind of legal institutional changes that its proponents believe might
have prevented the crisis. The paper begins with an examination of the Governance paradigm rationale
for legal infrastructure reform before surveying the Indonesian experience. It concludes with a critique of
Governance reform practices and suggests some lessons learned for future legal infrastructure reform,
drawn from the Indonesia case study. It argues that the Governance paradigm promotes overly simplistic
approaches to the complex and political project of legal infrastructure reform in developing states.
Mahmood R 2004. Can information and communication technology help reduce corruption? How so and why
not: two case studies from South Asia. Perspectives on global development and technology 3(3): 347–373
This paper explores the linkages between electronic governance and corruption deterrence, and by doing
so, fills a crucial void in the current literature. After reviewing successful ICT-led government reform efforts
in the West from public administration literature, a simple model is proposed to determine how these
technologies may come to be utilised for reform. The model is then applied to the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh and the neighbouring government of Bangladesh to test the salience of the variables, and to
determine why the former may be more successful than the latter.
Manion M 2004. Lessons for mainland China from anti-corruption reform in Hong Kong. China review
4(2): 81–97
This article presents Hong Kong an excellent example of successful anti-corruption reforms. It sets out
four general lessons that Hong Kong’s experience offers for ongoing anti-corruption efforts in mainland
China. The article then presents flaws in anti-corruption reform in mainland China that are illuminated by
the contrast with the Hong Kong experience.
Maor M 2004. Feeling the heat? Anticorruption mechanisms in comparative perspective. Governance
17(1): 55–80
This paper addresses the implications of political executives losing control over corruption investigations
of senior officeholders following the creation of anti-corruption mechanisms (e.g. commissions, special
prosecutors, independent counsels, investigating judges). When investigations hit close to home, the