Review of anti-corruption strategies Rob McCusker - Australian ...

Cross-sectoral strategies
Sound anti-corruption strategies recognise the level and degree of formal and informal interaction
between agencies, organisations and individuals.It is imperative that such strategies incorporate changes
in the practices of the public and private sectors. In addition, efforts should be made to increase public
awareness of corrupt practices and to garner support from the public in the detection and reporting of
corrupt behaviour. These issues are discussed in greater detail below.
Public sector
It has been suggested that strategies that reduce the benefits of paying and/or receiving bribes can only
result in positive results for the anti-corruption effort. Reform of the civil (public) service is an essential
initial policy. The provision of adequate pay is a useful first step because, if the service pays lower salaries
than can be obtained by similarly qualified personnel elsewhere, then there is, arguably, a temptation for
civil servants to engage in bribery. However, it is possible that higher pay may simply increase the level
of bribe sought by the official concerned. Thus, it might be essential to remove other benefits (such as a
pension scheme) from those civil servants who, despite receiving pay increases, continue to engage in
corrupt behaviour. Equally, the selection of civil servants needs to be transparent, to avoid the potential for
bribery of officials in exchange for a government post.
A further level of civil service control, which relates both to the briber and bribee, could also be instituted
whereby the civil servant who accepts a bribe could be fined a multiple of bribes received, as well as losing
his/her post, pension and allied benefits. The briber could be penalised in terms of the profits made from the
bribe (if, for example, the bribe facilitated the obtaining of a lucrative contract) rather than in relation to the level
of the bribe itself. Similarly, it might be possible to include a debarment procedure which would prevent a briber
from contracting with the government on any project for a specified and economically debilitating period.
Other reforms such as those of the judiciary and the provision of independent review and investigative
bodies are essential if the civil service reforms are to have full resonance. More broadly, corruption
within the public service might be mitigated by reducing the benefits under the control of officials. First,
it might be possible to eliminate programs identified with corrupt practices. Thus, for example, if a state
department has no direct authority to restrict exports or to license businesses (both activities facilitating
the demand for corrupt payments), with that decision being taken by an independent body, there will be
no point in bribes being sought or proffered. Secondly, if policies increase privatisation then competition
may control contracts rather than bribery of a monopolising state.
If the privatisation process is not managed in a systematic and holistic manner there remains a possibility
of corruption displacement. For example, a USAID project successfully reduced the number of bribeextraction
points along a transport route for onions in Niger. Unfortunately, as the onions neared
the Abidjan food markets, bribes were sought and paid at those points instead. Where government
involvement in financial exchanges is essential, such as in the case of tax revenue collection, the issue
becomes one of process reform in streamlining administrative processes to reduce the ability of officials to
request payment. Other efforts might include rewarding those who report the malfeasance of other public
servants and the rotation of staff to prevent entrenched corruption from forming. However, this needs to
be approached cautiously, given that if the department in question is corrupt to the core, then rotation
will be of limited effect and honest employees may be assigned unpleasant duties for failing to engage in
corrupt behaviour (Rose-Ackerman 1997).
Civil service reform or the creation of professional and well-motivated civil service is integral to the anticorruption
process. Political appointments destabilise the civil service, undermine continuity and hamper
development of institutional values and standards. There is a need for merit based recruitment and
promotion mechanisms that restrain political patronage and create an impartial civil service, combined
with credible monitoring and law enforcement. Increasing salary reform for the civil service is often