Review of anti-corruption strategies Rob McCusker - Australian ...

Uprooting graft 2005. The economist 28 April: 26
This article notes the first verdict handed down by Indonesia’s new anti-corruption court in relation to the
conviction of the governor of Aceh province, Abdullah Puteh, of taking 3.6 billion rupiah ($380,000) of
12.6 billion rupiah that had been allocated to buy a helicopter. Mr Puteh was imprisoned for ten years—
two more than the prosecutors had demanded—and fined 500m rupiah.
Villaroman N 2005. Laws and jurisprudence on graft and corruption: a compendium. Quezon City:
Central Books
This book contains a range of pertinent anti-corruption legislation including the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and the
Forfeiture Law.
Webb P 2005. The United Nations convention against corruption. Journal of international economic law
8(1): 191–229
This paper sets the context for the UN Convention against Corruption by considering the first wave of
anti-corruption initiatives that occurred at the regional level. It then assesses the significance of this new
international convention by examining the negotiating process and the strategic positions of different
countries. In particular, it analyses the four areas that generated the most controversy during the
negotiations: asset recovery, private sector corruption, political corruption, and monitoring. Although the
Convention contains many innovative provisions, the paper suggests that it also suffers from some basic
weaknesses that may prevent it from having a real impact on corrupt behaviour.
Wedeman A 2005. Anticorruption campaigns and the intensification of corruption in China. Journal of
contemporary China 14(42): 93–116
This paper analyses the efficacy of China’s campaign-style anti-corruption strategy using a combination of
formal modelling and empirical data. The analysis suggests that while this sort of strategy may succeed in
keeping corruption under control, it is likely to do so by deterring low-level corruption, but not high-level,
high stakes corruption, and may encourage inflation of the size of bribes. The article thus concludes that
campaign-style enforcement may have actually contributed to the intensification of corruption.
Wu X 2005. Corporate governance and corruption: a cross-country analysis. Governance 18(2): 151–170
This paper argues that corporate governance is among the important factors determining the level of
corruption. Using a cross-country data set, hypotheses that explicitly link various measures of corporate
governance to the level of corruption are tested. The results show that corporate governance standards
can have profound impacts on the effectiveness of the global anti-corruption campaign.
Yang D 2005. Integrity for hire: an analysis of a widespread program for combating customs corruption.
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and Department of Economics, University of Michigan.
http://www.umich.edu/%7Edeanyang/papers/yang_psi.pdf
Leadership data used in paper available at http://www.umich.edu/%7Edeanyang/papers/psi_leaderdata/
psi_leaderdata.html
This paper examines the impact of hiring private firms to collect information for government anticorruption
efforts. In the past two decades, a number of developing countries have hired private firms
to conduct pre-shipment inspections of imports, generating data that governments can use to fight
corruption in customs agencies. The paper notes that countries implementing such inspection programs
subsequently experience large increases in import duty collections. By contrast, the growth rate of
other tax revenues does not change appreciably. Additional evidence suggests that declines in customs
corruption are behind the import duty improvements: the programs also lead to declines in undervaluation
and in misreporting of goods classifications.