Review of anti-corruption strategies Rob McCusker - Australian ...

The low incidence of corruption in the Hong Kong SAR is not due solely to the establishment and
effectiveness of ICAC. A supportive public has made it possible to tackle corruption on all fronts in the
community and the rule of law in general within Hong Kong SAR is respected. Consequently, the often
difficult task of apprising the public of the existence, nature and consequences of corruption was made
all the more easier for the relevant authorities. Straddling all such efforts has been an overwhelming
government commitment particularly in terms of the provision of sufficient resources and adequate
legal powers to tackle corruption (Lai 2002). In addition, there was a simultaneous strengthening of
law enforcement agencies in both Hong Kong SAR and Singapore. In Singapore, civil servants’ pay
increased substantially relative to the private sector. Public officials were routinely rotated to make
it harder for corrupt officials to develop strong ties to certain clients. Rewards were given to those
who refused bribes and turned in a client. Rules and procedures were simplified and published often,
permits and approvals were scrapped and fees (including import duties) were lowered or removed. In
both Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, political support was forthcoming, something which cannot be
guaranteed in other, poorer jurisdictions.
In Thailand new institutions including the Constitutional Court and the National Counter-Corruption
Commission (NCCC) are expected to serve as key pillars in the battle against corruption and misuse
of power by politicians and public officials. The NCCC has been empowered to investigate allegations
of corruption among politicians and government officials and has power to prosecute wrongdoers.
Politicians and public officials must submit reports on assets and liabilities and the NCCC can investigate
whether those reports are true (Bunbongkarn 2003).
Consideration has been given to the true impact of anti-corruption commissions upon the long term
eradication or control of corruption in countries other than Hong Kong SAR or Singapore where a
unique conflation of cultural, political and legislative issues occurred. It has been argued that if the legal
framework is not present or lacks essential components such as the ability of the commission concerned
to enforce the law then the power of that commission would be effectively usurped. Second, if the
commission is not truly independent from the state that create it a similar disjuncture may occur. Finally,
the lack of effective oversight of even the most advanced commission undermines the perception of its
actual or prospective impact upon corruption (Heilbrunn 2004).
For others, such agencies constitute a potential danger in the sense that they might become reactive
rather than proactive and may target the wrong areas for the wrong reasons and with concomitantly
wrong results if they lack specific intelligence on corrupt practices. It is suggested that the archetypal
anti-corruption commission epitomised by the Hong Kong SAR ICAC may not be of universal application
given its expense and requirement of wholesale political support. However, a donor supported agency
whose remit was predetermined by internal and external consultation may in fact provide a generic
foundation for more enhanced anti-corruption reform (Doig & Riley 1998).
Special governance zones
One important anti-corruption suggestion which seeks to exploit economic drivers has been the creation
of a special governance zone (SGZ) which is essentially a city or region within a country in which radical
and comprehensive reforms such as the payment of higher civil service salaries can be implemented.
These zones minimise the political risk to the leaders of the city/region in question, given that it is localised
and reversible if it fails and exportable if it does not. Such zones could actually recoup the financial outlay
required at their inception given that, in theory at least, as incidences of corruption fall economic growth
should increase and tax revenue from the newly legitimised business activities rise. More importantly,
public support and respect for the government’s anti-corruption stance should likewise increase.