Review of anti-corruption strategies Rob McCusker - Australian ...

overloads on existing ones or the import of frameworks that do not necessarily ‘fit’ local conditions – of
particular relevance to current proposals for a new Commonwealth anti-corruption agency.
Cameron L et al. 2005. Do attitudes towards corruption differ across cultures? Experimental evidence
from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. Department of Economics working papers series no. 943.
http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/research/workingpapers/wp05/943.pdf
This paper examines cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption by analysing individual decision
making in a corrupt experimental environment. The paper uses experiments which differentiate between the
incentives to engage in corrupt behaviour and the incentives to punish corrupt behaviour and allow further
exploration as to whether, in environments characterised by lower levels of corruption, there is both a lower
propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour and a higher propensity to punish corrupt behaviour. Based
on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, the paper
finds that there is more variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behaviour than in the propensities to
engage in corrupt behaviour across cultures. The results reveal that the subjects in India exhibit a higher
tolerance towards corruption than the subjects in Australia while the subjects in Indonesia behave similarly
to those in Australia. The subjects in Singapore have a higher propensity to engage in corruption than
the subjects in Australia. The paper also varied its experimental design to examine the impact of a more
effective punishment system and the effect of the perceived cost of bribery.
Case W 2005. Political mistrust in Southeast Asia. Comparative sociology 4(1–2); 81–100
This paper focuses on a number of contemporary leaderships in Southeast Asia that have produced
variable amounts of mass-level mistrust, including those of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand,
and Singapore.
Choon-Yin S 2005. Singapore’s experience in curbing corruption and the growth of the underground
economy. Sojourn 20(1): 39–66
This paper suggests, firstly, that an extensive underground economy (UGE) is undesirable because it
brings forth more harm than benefit to the economies and, secondly, that curbing corruption is a useful
measure to contain the growth of the UGE. The key to curbing corruption is the enactment of appropriate
rules as well as having in place good men – men who are incorruptible – to enact and enforce the rules.
The article uses Singapore as a case study.
Dreher A, Kotsogiannis C & McCorriston S 2005. How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow
economy. Econpapers http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0502/0502012.pdf
This paper analyses a simple model that captures the relationship between institutional quality, the
shadow economy and corruption. It shows that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the
shadow economy and affects the corruption market. The exact relationship between corruption and
institutional quality is, however, ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of the institutional
quality in the shadow and corruption markets. The predictions of the model are empirically tested – by
means of Structural Equation Modelling that treats the shadow economy and the corruption market as
latent variables – using data from OECD countries. The results show that an improvement in institutional
quality reduces the shadow economy directly and corruption both directly and indirectly (through its effect
on the shadow market).
Dusek L, Ortmann A & Lizal L 2005.Understanding corruption and corruptibility through experiments.
Prague economic papers 14(2); 147–62
This paper reviews a particular mode of investigation of corruption and corruptibility: experiments. The
paper assesses their strengths and weaknesses, and identifies areas where they could be particularly
useful in guiding policy choices – namely in designing incentive-compatible and effective anti-corruption
measures in public procurement.